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ARTICLE
A FEW GRAINS OF INCENSE:
LAW, RELIGION, AND POLITICS FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF THE “CHRISTIAN” AND
“PAGAN” DISPENSATIONS
PAUL HORWITZ†
INTRODUCTION
The pleasures of reading Steven D. Smith’s writing are varied
and immense. That certainly holds true for his substantial new book,
Pagans and Christians in the City.1 As with so much of his work,
Smith’s argument is presented simply and calmly, and with such
mild wit and irony as to be seductive. Yet there is no question that
in this book as elsewhere, Smith is unafraid of, and even courts,
disagreement and controversy.2 With a book as seemingly
panoptic as this,3 the real challenge is deciding which part of the
book to push and poke at.
†
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1
STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM
THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC (2018).
2
Smith thus has something in common with the eminently readable Mark
Tushnet, whose different perspective on the “culture wars” is mentioned twice in
Smith’s book but arguably has a larger influence than that. See id. at 344–45, 365–
66. Moreover, Tushnet is a founding member of the Critical Legal Studies school,
while Smith is arguably a “Crit” after his own fashion. See Paul Horwitz, More
“Vitiating Paradoxes”: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 943, 943–47
(2014) (proposing Smith’s inclusion in the limited ranks of “Conservative Critical
Legal Studies”). Both writers exemplify the puckishness of the best Crit legal writing
without the turgidity and obscurity that characterize the worst of it.
3
I say seemingly panoptic because, for a book that seems to cover so much of
Western religious and political history, and to apply that history to the contemporary
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In this Essay, I expand on a key aspect of Pagans and
Christians in the City, which features most prominently in the
chapter on the “[l]ogic” of pagan and Christian persecution4 and is
applied in subsequent chapters on modern America. The question
Smith focuses on—with an eye fixed as firmly on the present as on
the past—is the possibility of compromise under “Christian” or
“pagan” regimes during the Roman Empire. Smith argues that
from within each perspective, “peaceful and mutually respectful
coexistence should have been possible, if only the other side would
be less unreasonable.”5 From its point of view, each regime
demanded little. But from the perspective of the party asked to
give something up, the terms of compromise could not be accepted
“without sacrificing or betraying its own beliefs and
commitments.”6 From this perspective, such stubborn resistance
to even a minor degree of compromise would naturally be seen as
demonstrating the unreasonableness and, perhaps, reactionary
and dangerous nature of the other side.

United States, there are surprising absences. Although Smith is clear that the terms
“Christian” and “pagan” include other faiths, it was not until well into the book that I
noticed just how little many faiths, Western and non-Western and certainly well
within the universe of modern American religious pluralism, feature in his book.
Despite making cameo appearances, faiths like Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism,
Confucianism, and Mormonism play a remarkably small role, and none appear in the
index. “Jews and Judaism” won a spot in the index and many mentions in the text but
are, I think, mostly incidental. For discussion, see generally Michael A. Helfand, Jews
and the Culture Wars: Consensus and Dissensus in Jewish Religious Liberty Advocacy,
56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 305 (2019); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Jews,
Not Pagans, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 497 (2019).
And although the book takes in both the Tiber and the Potomac, the ground between
them goes unexamined. We hear nothing of Poland and Hungary, for example, both of
which have witnessed fierce religious and political contestation in the past couple of
years. (Some of this, to be fair, occurred after Smith had finished writing the book.)
This omission may make a difference. Smith focuses on the United States but notes
that “a parallel struggle is arguably occurring through much of the Western world
(and perhaps beyond).” SMITH, supra note 1, at 260. The focus on the United States
makes it harder to link his narrative to recent global developments concerning religion
and politics and the broader culture wars, such as the rise of political populism, not
just as a matter of “Trumpism” but globally; the rise of illiberalism and of newly
energized critiques of liberalism; and the rise of religious integralism. An examination
of these topics might support or weaken Smith’s general argument for a link between
past and present; it might also make his prescriptions less attractive.
4
SMITH, supra note 1, at 130.
5
Id. at 131.
6
Id.

2019]

A FEW GRAINS OF INCENSE

127

This is a valuable and under-appreciated insight. Of course it
is hardly unknown. The general meliorist tendencies of American
legal academics and other American cultural commentators,
however—our default desire, at least until recently, to “just get[ ]
along,”7 to “resolv[e] or ameliorat[e] social conflict”8—may lead us
to focus more on the purported solutions to our problems than on
the nature of conflict itself. And Smith’s point is precisely that the
various proposals aimed at convincing us to “just get along” are
part of the problem.9 Nor do the generally normative tendencies
of American legal scholars help. Their work often tends to treat
descriptive work as mere prologue, a foundation for the latest
proposed solution. Much more can and should be said about the
problems themselves, without feeling any need to offer a solution.
I pursue that aim here. My goal is neither to praise nor to
bury Smith’s argument, but to expand on it. Smith’s basic point—
that both sides in the current culture wars, like those in the
“culture wars” between Christians and pagans, propose what they
consider only small sacrifices, which from the other party’s
perspective are actually unacceptable and dangerous—merits
further discussion.10 Smith’s point suggests that in the areas of
both religious free exercise and nonestablishment, the contest
between offers of compromise seen by each side as “reasonable”
has been an important part of our current disagreements.
Although this Essay is structured around Smith’s book, it
ultimately uses the book as a jumping-off point. My broader goal
is to explore the role that the logic of persecution plays in the
current disputes within American law and religion scholarship
and jurisprudence, and much of American society beyond that.
My aim here is mostly descriptive. It is more focused on what
one might call the sociology and political economy of religion and
cultural-political conflict than on prescribing a solution to it. My
concern is with the how and the why of the conflicts Smith
describes, not with their solution. Indeed, I have strong doubts
7

Id. at 157.
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
839, 877 (2014).
9
SMITH, supra note 1, at 157.
10
See Andrew Koppelman, This Isn’t About You: A Comment on Smith’s Pagans
and Christians in the City, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 393, 400 & n.39 (2019) (noting
Smith’s acknowledgment that in ancient and modern culture wars “both sides are
struggling to avoid being dominated, culturally and politically,” but arguing that
Smith does not pursue this point sufficiently in his book).
8
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that the somewhat normative view of the modern “Christian city”
that Smith offers in his conclusion is likely to turn out as he
describes it, or to be any more successful than the “pagan city” that
he suggests has not proved to be “a viable basis for community
under current circumstances.”11
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I describes Smith’s
account of the dilemmas of compromise and the logic of persecution.
It is a summary section, although in it I emphasize some factors
that may help expand on Smith’s thesis. Parts II and III explore
the relevance of that thesis to the current culture wars and their
intersection with religion and American law and politics, focusing
on free exercise and nonestablishment, respectively. Part IV
further supplements Smith’s account, suggesting additional details,
factors, and dynamics that may make compromise difficult or
impossible.
A few notes about the boundaries of this Essay are necessary.
First, I work within Smith’s basic account, not outside or against
it. There is certainly room to question both Smith’s account of
“pagans” and “Christians” in ancient Rome and its application to
contemporary culture.12 But I mostly take Smith’s basic account
as a given for purposes of this Essay. Except insofar as they affect
my effort to expand upon and color in some of Smith’s picture, I
put to one side doubts about his basic account of “pagans” and
“Christians,” ancient or modern, and work within it instead. That
11

SMITH, supra note 1, at 377–78; cf. ALAN JACOBS, THE YEAR OF OUR LORD 1943:
CHRISTIAN HUMANISM IN AN AGE OF CRISIS 79 (2018) (“Our period is not so unlike the
age of Augustine: the planned society, caesarism of thugs or bureaucrats, paideia,
scientia, religious persecution, are all with us. Nor is there even lacking the possibility
of a new Constantinism; letters have already begun to appear in the press,
recommending religious instruction in schools as a cure for juvenile delinquency; Mr.
Cochrane’s terrifying description of the ‘Christian’ empire under Theodosius should
discourage such hopes of using Christianity as a spiritual benzedrine for the earthly
city.” (quoting 2 W. H. AUDEN, Augustus to Augustine, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
W.H. AUDEN: PROSE, 1939–1948 226, 231 (Edward Mendelson ed. 2002)); id. at 96–98
(discussing Simone Weil’s argument that the dominant Christianity of the Gothic
Middle Ages, following a period in which European Christianity “lived in the midst of,
and peacefully tolerated, profanity and error,” ushered in a period of “totalitarian
spirituality” that damaged Christian civilization and gave rise to movements, such as
“nonreligious, or antireligious, humanism,” that constituted “a genuine attempt,
however misguided and doomed to failure, to seek spiritual freedom from the
oppression imposed by the ‘imposition of belief’ of the Gothic era” (quoting SIMONE
WEIL, The Romanesque Renaissance, in SELECTED ESSAYS 1934–1943, at 44 (Richard
Rees trans., 1962))).
12
See generally Steven D. Smith, Introduction to the Symposium, 56 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 247 (2019).
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said, as will become evident, I do not fully agree with all of his
characterizations of the modern “pagan” or “Christian” approaches
to free exercise or nonestablishment, and I make those doubts
clear. I am particularly critical—in the sense of raising critical
questions rather than of mere disapproval—of his treatment of
disputes concerning religious symbols.
Second, and somewhat faute de mieux, I do not question
Smith’s basic historical account. It is surely capable of being
questioned and criticized. Any historical account is, especially one
that takes in such a vast scope. But, although I have some
familiarity with the literature, that task requires someone with
much more training in classical and early Christian history.
Embarrassingly for a generally educated person and a scholar, I
do not even read Latin, let alone classical Greek.
Third, I emphasize again that my goals are primarily
descriptive and exploratory, not prescriptive. For present
purposes, I am not interested in taking a strong side on the
conflicts and compromises discussed here. And, as Smith notes, to
the extent that we recognize that the contending sides in our
culture wars “are struggling to avoid being dominated, culturally
and politically,” we might find sympathy even for those with whom
we are inclined to disagree.13
Finally, my primary focus is on only a few chapters of Smith’s
book, particularly Chapters Six and Nine, with some treatment of
Chapters Seven and Ten. Even within these strictures, I think
there is still considerable room to both advance and question the
account that Smith offers.
I.

“SMALL SACRIFICES” AND THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION

Smith’s book opens with what he sees as a puzzling question,
one that stretches from ancient to modern times and, as it were,
from the Tiber to the Potomac. The question, in effect, is: Why
bother persecuting others?
What counts as “persecution” varies, of course. The stakes
involved are very different between then and now. But there is
some continuity in the basic question. Why should Pliny the
Younger bother to execute Christians in the province of Bithynia,
putting to the sword those who openly avowed their faith or
refused to make offerings to statues of the emperor Trajan and of

13

Id. at 265 n.32.
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the Roman gods? Why, if they showed otherwise “innocuous or
even laudable behavior,” apart from an “unshakeable obstinacy,”
should they be punished?14 Why should the “rulers of the Roman
Empire” have persisted in doing so a century later, despite the
“Romans’ reputation for broad-minded religious toleration”?15 And
why, in our own time, would plaintiffs in cases involving
antidiscrimination laws in public accommodations, in which the
services sought are “readily available from other[s]” who have no
religious objections to providing those services, “insist on suing
people whose services they neither need nor want?”16 Why would
people bother “using the law to crack down on a religion or a way
of life that they disapprove of but that doesn’t seem to be
realistically harming them or interfering with their own lives in
any obvious way”?17
One can expect some fairly standard and perhaps indignant
answers to this question. They would invoke terms such as
equality, equal dignity, harm to others, and so on. These answers
are especially likely to arise in cases in which actions or services
are connected to the provision of government benefits or public
goods—a category that expands the more we rely on actors in the
marketplace, acting under the regulatory umbrella of the state, to
provide goods such as contraceptive care rather than having the
state provide them directly. They will also arise in cases involving
the capacious category of “public accommodations,” especially
when we treat the refusal itself as the harm, regardless of whether
substitute providers are available.
I do not mean to belittle these important and sincere
responses. But one could easily imagine similar responses from a
pagan supporter of the persecution of Christians or, later, a
Christian supporter of the suppression of pagan practices. The
terms, values, and concepts invoked might differ. Still, here too
one might hear claims about the harms to society of these
practices, their fundamental offensiveness to the public welfare,
the “obstinacy” of the objectors, and so on. One could quarrel with
14
15

Id. at 1–3.
Id. at 3–4.

16
Id. at 6. Smith draws on the writing of Douglas Laycock here and makes clear
that Laycock is equally happy to pose the question to the other “side,” asking why
religious Christians would insist on “regulations of sexual activity” by others,
including opposing the legality of same-sex marriage. Id. at 6–7; see, e.g., Laycock,
supra note 8, at 848–51.
17
SMITH, supra note 1, at 7.
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the facts. But from the standpoint of the regnant regime, its
values, and its concern for self-preservation, the answers would
hardly be outrageous.
The question thus persists in both cases: Why bother? Or at
least, why bother if the society is otherwise ostensibly tolerant of
religious and other differences, the individuals involved are
otherwise obedient to the law and capable of contributing to the
society, and the harms alleged in individual cases are not
immediate, apparent, grave, and urgent?
One answer to this question was provided by Justice Holmes:
This sort of persecutory conduct is “perfectly logical. If you have
no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result
with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and
sweep away all opposition.”18 If your premises and your desired
results are not painted in purely conclusory or mercenary terms
but are imbued with a seeming spirit of public-mindedness and, at
least in modern times, a potentially expansive vision of the
tangible or intangible harms involved in the offending conduct,
then suppressing that conduct seems natural, even necessary.
Smith’s own answer is richer than that, adding important
details missing from Holmes’s aperçu. In particular, he offers a
more dynamic and cyclical account of the logic of persecution.19
His answer to the questions he poses depends not simply on the
apparent rightness of the dominant regime but on its ostensibly
pluralistic, accommodating nature and its willingness to
compromise.20 From the perspective of each dominant regime—
first the “pagan” regime and then, although Smith has much less
to say about this, the “Christian” regime—persecution was logical
not because the other side was so terrible but because it was so
unreasonable. One cannot be “unshakeabl[y] obstina[te]” about
nothing.21 There must be a “something” to be obstinate about, an
outstretched hand that one refuses to take.
This is how things look from the perspective of the regimes he
discusses. From the perspective of each regime, the other side was
obstinate in its refusal to accept the considerable compromises
that the regime offered, compromises that demanded at most a
small sacrifice from the other side. In each case, the failure from
18
19
20
21

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
SMITH, supra note 1, at 151–53.
Id. at 151–52.
Id. at 152.
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the dominant perspective to understand why the sacrifice was not
seen as small led to the view that the other side was simply being
obstinate, and in turn to the conclusion that it was “inflexible,
dogmatic,” and “undeserving of accommodation.”22 It is this lesson
Smith draws from history. It is a lesson we can usefully apply to
better understand the dynamics of current events and the factors
that influence those dynamics.
Begin with what Smith calls the “Christian position,” the
compromise the early Christians offered to what was then the
ruling regime: what I will call in this Essay the “pagan
dispensation,” the prevailing system of order at the time.23
According to this view, Christians “insisted that they could still be
loyal subjects of the earthly city” despite their “ultimate
commitment” to the “heavenly city” of God.24 They could support
the empire’s aims, pray for its leaders and soldiers, share in its
commerce and much of its public and social life, and pay their
share of taxes to the state.25 They believed, and proposed to their
rulers, “that peaceful coexistence should be possible on fair and
mutually acceptable terms.”26
This offer was not always rejected. The persecution of
Christians was hardly a constant in ancient Roman life, despite
“spasms of frightful violence.”27 Often enough, the offer was
accepted; but it was accepted “more [as] a matter of pragmatic
accommodation than of agreement on principles.”28 It worked well
enough when little was at stake or when the areas of disagreement
were not highly visible. The empire was accustomed to “putting
up with all manner of exotic cults.”29
At other times, however, the fundamental differences between
the empire and the Christians, and the imperial perception that
Christians posed a threat to the well-being of the regime, became
more salient, in ways that may be relevant to contemporary
conflicts. It mattered that while some Christians were willing to
engage, however perfunctorily, in ritual civic shows of loyalty to
22

Id. at 153.
Id. at 136.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 136–37.
26
Id. at 136.
27
Id. at 138 n.44 (quoting RAMSAY MACMULLEN, PAGANISM IN THE ROMAN
EMPIRE 134 (1981)).
28
Id. at 138.
29
Id. at 139.
23
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the empire and its pantheon, others viewed participation in such
events as “a forbidden performance of idolatrous worship.”30 And
“[s]ometimes the dilemma arose in connection with commercial
activity.”31 Participation in the “authorized” marketplace required
a willingness to engage in ritual shows of loyalty such as giving
“specific divine honours to the Caesars.”32 The intertwinement of
public and private, of the market and the state, made it
“impossible [for Christians] to escape the observance of
[polytheistic rituals], without, at times, renouncing the commerce
of mankind, and all the offices and amusements of society.”33
Finally, the Christian refusal to participate in certain public
rituals, combined with their condemnation of pagan practices and
beliefs, would have been seen as “an offense against the ‘dignity’
of the censured pagans.”34
Taken together, the compromise proposed by the Christians,
under which they would obey the law and pay their taxes but
refuse to engage in basic public shows of loyalty that involved
acknowledging and not criticizing the pagan gods, could not be
accepted by the leadership of the pagan dispensation.35 The
Christians would thus come to be seen as stubborn, unreasonable,
and “censorious and dogmatic,” and so confirm the regime in its
refusal to accept the compromise and make persecution more
likely.36
What of the pagan dispensation’s own proposals for “peaceful
coexistence”?37 The pagan offer of compromise was essentially the
same one that had been made to and accepted by a variety of other
faiths within the Roman Empire,38 although those negotiations
were surely not always voluntary. The offer was one of “reciprocity.”
Each side would respect each other’s deity or deities, not so much
through mutual toleration as through absorption.39 The pagans
would welcome God, Jesus, or both onto the roster of deities, just
30

Id. at 140.
Id. at 141.
32
Id. (quoting BRUCE W. WINTER, DIVINE HONOURS FOR THE CAESARS: THE FIRST
CHRISTIANS’ RESPONSES 286 (2015)).
33
Id. (quoting 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF
THE ROMAN EMPIRE 460–61 (Modern Library ed. 1995) (1776)).
34
Id. at 149.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 150.
38
Id.
39
Id.
31
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as they had welcomed other gods. In turn, the Christians would
be expected to show respect for that roster. Not much, from the
pagan point of view, was required. Whatever Christians believed
and whoever they worshipped in their own communities, on public
or civic occasions they would perform “small sacrificial gestures to
the gods.”40 In Edward Gibbon’s words, “[i]f [the Christians]
consented to cast a few grains of incense upon the altar” of the gods
when before a public tribunal, they would be “dismissed from the
tribunal in safety and with applause.”41 This was not much to ask,
and might be seen as a form of “modest unity” of its time.42
Just as the Christians, in Smith’s account, offered a
compromise that struck them as reasonable but was unacceptable
to the pagans, so the pagan offer, which to them “would have
seemed inoffensive and easy to comply with,” was a non-starter for
many Christians.43 Even if it involved only an empty ceremonial
gesture, their monotheistic beliefs rendered the “ostensible
reciprocity” of the pagan compromise a disingenuous “sham” to be
rejected.44
That refusal would encourage the pagans to view the Christians
as “inflexible, dogmatic, and unworthy of accommodation” and
perforce worthy of—perhaps in need of, for the sake of a wellordered society—persecution.45 A group that vocally rejects what
are seen as basic norms of social reciprocity and basic sources of
civic unity may well be seen as a threat to the existing order that
loses any expectation of tolerant treatment. This, then, is the
vision of offer and counteroffer under the shadow of the pagan
dispensation, one in which each “held out terms of mutual
accommodation that seemed fair and reasonable to them, but that
for discernible reasons were not—and could not be—accepted by
the other side,” leading to suspicion and ultimately persecution.46
Smith is less clear about conditions under the Christian
dispensation. He harbors no doubt that by the end of the fourth
century, “Christianity was now officially in control; paganism was
40

Id. at 151.
Id. (quoting GIBBON, supra note 33, at 537–38).
42
JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH
DEEP DIFFERENCE 15 (2018). To be clear, this is not the modest unity Inazu is thinking
of with respect to our own time.
43
SMITH, supra note 1, at 151.
44
Id. at 151–52.
45
Id. at 153.
46
Id. at 131.
41
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officially (if not in practice) banished.”47 He acknowledges that a
leading account of how it happened describes the use of “political”
and “coercive” measures.48 And he admits at the least that, just as
the pagan regime sometimes persecuted Christians and sometimes
didn’t, the Christian regime sometimes persecuted or legally
outlawed paganism and sometimes didn’t.49 But, emphasizing the
“disagreements among able historians,” his discussion remains
rather inconclusive, even elusive.50
Still, Smith gives us a good look at the details of persecution
under both the Christian and the pagan regimes of later eras, in a
period of greater unsettlement than had prevailed during
Christianity’s first century, when the Roman Empire was most
firmly entrenched. We may be able to work backwards from that
evidence to come up with some sense of what compromise, if any,
the Christian dispensation offered.
Working out of historical sequence, Smith describes
persecution during periods of Christian rule as varied, laxly
enforced, and often more a matter of control over civic and
symbolic spaces than of outright repression, though he
acknowledges that “the clear overall trend was toward the official
elevation of Christianity and the repression of paganism.”51
Constantine’s “imperial rigor” was more likely to be aimed at
Christians themselves, as they underwent internecine disputes,
than against the pagans themselves.52 Toward the latter, his
policy was one of toleration.53 Nevertheless, under his rule
Christianity “passed from being a persecuted to a preferred
47

Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 162. It is perhaps suggestive that Smith draws heavily at the outset of
his book on T.S. Eliot’s lectures, The Idea of a Christian Society. See id. at 8–15. Alan
Jacobs, in his book The Year of Our Lord 1943, calls these lectures “a masterpiece of
vagueness and evasion,” noting many “disavowals”—statements about what Eliot is
not saying or discussing, without remedying the “obliquities” in what he does
discuss—that form “[o]ne of the [lectures’] most persistent and curious tics.” JACOBS,
supra note 11, at 105–06. One might make similar charges of vagueness and obliquity
against the recent literature espousing some form of Catholic integralism—a
literature that Smith does not associate himself with here explicitly, but that shares
an interest in the theme of the modern “Christian City,” the possibility of which Smith
returns to at the end of his book. SMITH, supra note 1, at 377–79.
51
SMITH, supra note 1, at 172.
52
Id. at 167.
53
Id. at 166 (discussing PAUL VEYNE, WHEN OUR WORLD BECAME CHRISTIAN:
312–394 (2010)).
48

136

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 58:125

faith.”54 He ordered some pagan temples closed and banned some
pagan practices. Christian churches were often built on the site of
the former pagan places of worship.55
Constantine’s son and successor, Constantius, forbade pagan
sacrifices, closed more pagan temples, and set heavy punishments
for the violation of these edicts—although these laws went largely
unenforced and Constantius himself made “a friendly tour of
[Rome’s] pagan temples.”56 Nevertheless, “antipagan laws and
precedents were slowly and quietly accumulating.”57 Following an
interlude of pagan rule, later Christian emperors, especially
Theodosius, “adopted a harsher series of laws closing temples and
forbidding pagan sacrifices.”58 Even when the officials were not
strict in enforcing their laws, “mobs of militant monks and other
faithful” sometimes took more violent action against pagans and
their temples.59
The pagan reaction, during a brief period of pagan rule by the
emperor Julian following Constantius’s death in 361, was similar in
many respects. Julian “purport[ed] to embrace religious toleration”
but “gave preference to pagans for high office.”60 He required the
demolition of Christian churches that had been built over pagan
temples.61 Perhaps most relevantly for modern purposes, Julian
issued an edict “banning Christians from teaching in the schools
on the grounds that, since they did not believe in the gods, they were
morally unfit to teach the classics.”62 Quoting Adrian Murdoch,
Smith calls this “a masterstroke,” since such a measure would
effectively ensure that the elite would be pagan and Christians
would remain marginalized in the halls of power and culture.63
A key site of contestation through both Christian and pagan
periods of rule was the struggle over public symbols. Smith argues
that even if Christian laws forbidding pagan practices weren’t
always enforced, “such measures had a symbolic impact[,] . . .
gradually [inducing] subjects to conceive of the empire in more
54

Id.
Id. at 167.
56
Id. at 168.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 172.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 169.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 170 (quoting ADRIAN MURDOCH, THE LAST PAGAN: JULIAN THE APOSTATE
AND THE DEATH OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 139 (2003)).
55
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Christian terms.”64 But actual symbols, and public support for
them, were at issue more directly. As is true today, some civic
symbols were publicly supported and effectively represented the
voice of the state. “Culture wars” took place over what the state
would say and what it would subsidize:
[W]hen the Christian emperors of the later fourth century cut off
funding for the support of the temples and the vestal virgins, it
was not merely the withdrawal of material resources that
Christians applauded and pagans resented; it was the denial of
support that was perceived to be public in nature.65

In ways that echo contemporary debates, the bishop of Milan,
Ambrose, argued for denial of support in a manner that stretched
the definition of “public” and treated even indirect state support
as “state action.”66 Against an argument that money for pagan
temples had originally come from private bequests, Ambrose
counseled the emperor that the funds “had long been deemed part
of the public treasury.”67 Whatever the “technical[ ]” facts, if the
emperor restored those funds, “ ‘you will seem to give rather from
your own funds,’ and thus to be giving imperial approval to pagan
worship.”68 The Altar of Victory, a statue of the goddess by that
name, similarly served as the object of a tug-of-war between
pagans and Christians, alternately removed from and restored to
its place next to the Senate House.69
What does all this suggest about any compromises or proposals
for “peaceful coexistence” offered to pagans by Christians when the
latter were in power? We have already canvassed the compromise
offered by Christians during the pagan dispensation: Christians
would obey the law and pay their taxes, but refuse to worship any
pagan deities, perform pagan civic rituals, or keep silent about
their beliefs. But it is one thing to offer a compromise from a
position of weakness and another to offer it from a position of
strength. The two deserve to be examined separately.
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[https://perma.cc/LME9-FUMG]).
69
Id. at 175–76.
65

138

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 58:125

Here, Smith again offers less detail than he does concerning
the pagan dispensation and its refusal to accept Christian offers.
A stronger focus on the Christian emperor Theodosius—who
imposed legal bans on pagan sacrifices and even on visiting pagan
temples, ordered the closure of pagan temples and created the
opportunity to build churches over them, dammed the stream of
public support for pagan activities and institutions, and ultimately
declared paganism a “religio illicita”—certainly suggests that the
Christian dispensation left little room for peaceful coexistence.70
As I have noted, however, I work from within Smith’s framework
here, despite its lack of detail on these and other Christian
practices during periods of Christian political supremacy. What
we can say on the basis of Smith’s limited narrative is that if there
was a Christian offer of compromise, it was that paganism would
be suffered to continue, while being officially forbidden or
disfavored and stripped of any meaningful association with the
state and its symbols.
This puts things more strongly than Smith does. For much of
the early period of Christian dispensation, he writes,
most temples remained open despite the laws, statues and
images of the gods stared down from every corner of the cities,
public sacrifices continued to be offered in many parts of the
empire . . . , and the traditional religious routines of households
throughout the empire could continue unaffected.71

Even later Christian emperors, including Theodosius, “continued
to tolerate or even support paganism in various ways, and to
appoint substantial numbers of known pagans to high positions
within the empire.”72 On this view, the emperors engaged not in
wholehearted suppression, but in “halfhearted coercive and
somewhat more consistent symbolic support of the new religion.”73
Nevertheless, paganism lost more than its official backing.
To ban pagan practices and rituals, while leaving the bans
underenforced or unenforced, was to render paganism a kind of
black-market or grey-market religion. It would be officially
forbidden but permitted in practice; it would continue under
sufferance rather than as a matter of right. Given the continued
70

PHILIP HUGHES, THE CONVERSION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 16 (1957); RAMSAY
MACMULLEN, CHRISTIANIZING THE ROMAN EMPIRE 55–56, 100–01 (1984).
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GENERATION 102 (2015)).
72
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existence of many visible pagan symbols, it would be too much to
say that paganism was relegated to private spaces alone. But the
increasing removal of state support for pagan institutions—
including the continuation of what had initially been private
bequests—certainly suggests that its public status was being
squeezed into a smaller and narrower scope. And in a state in
which private and public—if those terms had any meaning—were
intertwined, the removal of public support was, and was seen as,
significant.74
Paganism, in Gibbon’s words, “would be deprived of [its] force
and energy, if [it was] no longer celebrated at the expense, as well
as in the name, of the republic.”75 Many pagans would accept these
terms, just as some Christians consented to cast a few grains of
incense on the altar of the Roman gods during the pagan
dispensation. Understandably, however, others would resist, or at
least worry that the “compromise” would lead to the passing of
their way of life.76
In the arguments over the Altar of Victory, we see at least one
pagan “counteroffer,” a familiar one given contemporary American
debates over civil religion and governmental religious displays. In
his argument that emperor Valentinian II should retain the altar,
the pagan senator and prefect Symmachus “emphasized that the
maintenance of the shrine was a way of preserving a continuity of
identity with Rome’s pagan past.”77 Retaining the altar would be
less a matter of faith than of custom and tradition.78 In modern
terms, the pagans proposed that pagan state symbols be retained
not for their religious value, but as an “acknowledgment” that
much of Roman history and tradition stemmed from paganism. It
is equally familiar and unsurprising that figures such as Ambrose

74
See id. at 174 (noting that the denial of public funding for vestal virgins and
other pagan institutions was seen as important by both Christians and pagans in part
because “it was the denial of support that was perceived to be public in nature”).
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Id. (quoting 2 GIBBON, supra note 33, at 75).
76
See id. at 176.
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Id. (quoting SYMMACHUS, RELATION 3 ¶ 8, https://people.ucalgary.ca/~vandersp/
Courses/texts/sym-amb/symrel3f.html (last visited June 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
4AER-85TB]).
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would reject this counteroffer, refusing to treat the statue as
lacking in religious significance and insisting that its continued
presence would “insult the Faith.”79
Based on the account so far, we can see several central factors
in the play of offer and counteroffer, acceptance and refusal, and
toleration and persecution that make up the early struggle
between the pagan and Christian dispensations and their
alternating offers of “peaceful coexistence.” They help fill in the
central thesis of this portion of Smith’s book: that each side in that
era’s culture war “held out terms of mutual accommodation that
seemed fair and reasonable to them, but that for discernible
reasons were not . . . accepted by the other side.”80 The factors
identified here are hardly novel or surprising. They are common
ingredients in many cultural-political struggles, including our
own. Setting them out clearly may nevertheless be useful, both in
understanding Smith’s book and in setting a foundation on which
we can expand on or add detail to the argument he presents there.
The very familiarity of these common features may be
significant in its own right. These factors are easily recognized
when looking at some historical event, but may be less visible
when applied to our own situation—especially for those who are
actively engaged in the struggles of our own time.81 Setting out
these factors with respect to events occurring over several
centuries and multiple regimes may make those factors more
perspicuous when applied to current events. And it may incline
us to greater charity toward the combatants on both sides, while
making clearer the extent to which apparently sincere and novel
arguments and reactions are, from another perspective, rehearsals
of long-familiar steps in an old dance.
First, then, taking Smith’s account as a given, the actions
taken by each regime are not simply coercive, oppressive, or
persecutory. Purely arbitrary or bigoted persecution occurs, of
course, but is better associated with unstable tyrannies than with
relatively stable and longer-lasting political regimes. Coercion
Id. (quoting AMBROSE, EPISTLE 18 ¶ 31, https://people.ucalgary.ca/~vandersp/
Courses/texts/sym-amb/ambrep17.html (last visited June 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
GJD4-JV6B]).
80
Id. at 131.
81
Id. at 259. For a discussion of the value of the past, for Simone Weil and C.S.
Lewis, in offering a picture of human life in which “[o]ur attachments and our passions
do not so thickly obscure” our vision, see Jacobs, supra note 11, at 95–96 (quoting
WEIL, supra note 11, at 44–45).
79
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and persecution, or prosecution, are less likely to occur, or to
command much attention or resources, with respect to minority
groups that are viewed as inconsequential and unthreatening.
And before any of those actions take place, a reasonably wellfunctioning society that contains a plurality of groups and views is
likely first to attempt to secure the loyalty and cooperation of that
group. In each of the cases we have examined, the first step taken
by the ruling regime was not hostility or violence but an attempt
at “peaceful coexistence . . . on fair and mutually acceptable
terms.”82
Second, the compromises offered were reasonable and fair
from the perspective of the ruling dispensation. Built into its view
of acceptable compromise was a set of premises about the basic
values of that society, and what was needed for the preservation
of those basic values and, by extension, of the society itself. Again,
at least for a society that was—from the kind of distance of time
and space that can momentarily bracket vast areas of internal
injustice and inequality, such as imperial conquest, the reliance
on slave labor, and the subordinate status of women, and focus
instead political and cultural elites—reasonably stable and
pluralistic, these values were not, or would not have been seen by
the ruling regime as, inherently unreasonable. To the contrary,
they would have been understood as natural, reasonable, and
essential for society to survive and flourish. The compromises
would have been seen as demanding little or nothing that they
would be unable to do easily: a few grains of incense thrown on the
altar, “a small gesture of respect,”83 or actions of reciprocity and
civic community that any decent citizen should have no trouble
performing.
Third, the compromises were viewed as unacceptable by the
side to which they were offered. Because each side “failed fully to
grasp and credit the other side’s commitments,” the offeror
proposed compromises that seemed easily acceptable but proved
impossible.84 To the side faced with the offer, the fact that the
dominant regime presented it as reasonable and easy to comply
with may have encouraged and exacerbated rejection. The
compromise might seem, from the perspective of the side faced
with the offer, unreasonable and unbearable—not a small sacrifice
82
83
84
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but “a betrayal of the faith.”85 The fact that such an offer was
presented as reasonable would fuel the suspicion that the offer was
a “sham,”86 the leading edge of a greater effort to wipe the offerees
out—a “first experiment on [their] liberties.”87
Fourth, this pattern of offer and refusal could lead to a cycle
of suspicion, reaction, hostility, and ultimately coercion or
persecution. The rejection of a “reasonable” offer would confirm
the regime’s view that it faced an “inflexible, dogmatic” group that
is “undeserving of accommodation.”88 That rejection would seem
even more bewildering and hostile, and thus deserving of a hostile
response, if it appeared to go against the offeree’s prior willingness
to live under those terms, just as many Christians did show a
willingness to cast their grains of incense on the altar of the
Roman gods. It would naturally encourage efforts to take a more
assertive position with respect to that group: to lay down strict
rules lest a group of this sort poison the body politic. And that
response would, in turn, confirm the suspicion of the other side
that the initial offer was a sham and the harbinger of greater
restrictions, reinforcing its decision to refuse and resist.
This pattern could arise despite and alongside the fifth point:
at any given time, the “logic of persecution” could be such that the
persecuting side could be seen, or view itself, as “not gratuitously
vindictive or malicious” in its actions but sensible and “entirely
rational.”89 Given the values and goals of a state or a political and
cultural regime, there are always “limits to what [can] be
accommodated.”90 Where a group appears to pose a threat to those
values, not least in what are seen as “troubled times”—and we
often view the present as troubled—it makes sense to address that
threat, as one would excise the harmless growth that may indicate
a tumor.91 No special hostility or bigotry was required and none
might be perceived, at least by the regulatory actor. It is, of course,
easier to accept that point from the distance of centuries than to
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apply it to one’s own time. And, as the fourth point suggests, the
dynamic of offer and refusal, regulation and reaction, could soon
enough add an extra edge to the responses of both sides.
This leads to the sixth point: over time, such contests became
struggles for power rather than efforts to arrive at terms of
peaceful coexistence. Such a perspective would seem especially
natural if individual disputes—over whether a statue would
remain in place or be removed, for instance—were viewed as one
piece of a larger, “providential” struggle between good and evil,92
or as one battle in a larger, inevitable narrative of irreversible
“progress[ ].”93 Even if a particular compromise is not seen that
way at first, the seeming obstinacy of the refusal of one side and
the seeming persecution resulting from that obstinate refusal will
soon convince each side that there is little room and no more time
left for “just getting along.”94
In this way, the ancient culture war became, in a way that
Smith suggests is true again today, and that may always be true
of such contests, “a struggle for ‘domination’—for control of the
cultural and political community and the self-conception by which
the community constitutes and governs itself.”95 The language of
offer and counteroffer with which Smith describes the efforts at
peaceful coexistence between pagans and Christians emphasizes
the hope of coexistence. But it may obscure the obvious truth that
it is much better to be in the position of the dominant group
making the offer than that of the subordinate group faced with
little choice but to accept or reject it, or at best to beg for the chance
to make a counteroffer. As I will suggest below, things may be
different when both sides are in equipoise and neither is in a
realistic position to take control. Any hint of instability will lead
to a more combative stance.
Again, we may view this observation critically or
sympathetically. “Americans,” Smith writes, “with their historic
commitment to liberty, are unlikely to sympathize with a party
that strives for ‘domination.’ ”96 But with enough distance the
matter may look different. It is at least understandable that both
sides should end up fighting for the strategic high ground rather
92
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than seeking to share that power or work out some modus vivendi.
And one may observe sympathetically, as Smith does, that in
war—cultural or otherwise—“the likely alternative to dominating
is being dominated.”97 From that perspective, “[w]e may be more
sympathetic” to those who “are struggling to avoid being
dominated, culturally and politically.”98
This power struggle is in large measure a contest over who
gets to define the baseline values against which a “reasonable”
offer of compromise is made and against which the side that rejects
the offer may be seen as undeserving of further accommodation or
outreach. We can thus see the seventh point: that cultural and
political power struggles are “in large measure a struggle to
control public symbols.”99 It is unsurprising that so much of the
contest between pagans and Christians involved control over
symbols such as the Altar of Victory, or that they fought over
which religion would receive “imperial approval,” even if the other
faith was still tolerated.100 Each side, struggling to occupy the
position of the dominant party that offers compromises, sought
through power over symbols to “create a conception of the city” as
pagan—or Christian.101
That so much should be seen as turning on tangible or
intangible symbols, and that control over these symbols should
have played out as a part of a larger struggle for political and
cultural control, suggests an eighth and final point: the
importance and malleability of the scope of “public” and “private.”
This point is commonly recognized today.102 But while it is often
discussed by scholars, at any given moment the public may have a
more fixed view of what constitutes public or private—and those
who are intellectually aware of the complexities of these questions
may ignore or forget them when they engage as advocates in the
culture wars themselves. So time and distance, again, may help.
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The shifting and potentially expanding notion of what
constituted a “public” matter deserving of the state’s attention and
regulation is clearly visible in the struggles between Christians
and pagans in the Roman Empire. The Altar of Victory was
unquestionably a “public symbol,” one that served an obvious role
in the civic structure, and it had been placed there by Augustus.103
It was also a shrine, next door to and not in the Senate House.104
But both sides saw it as clearly public in every sense and of
immense actual and symbolic importance.105 Both sides fought over
forms of support that were “perceived to be public in nature.”106
This entailed a fight not just over actual public support, but over
what constituted “public” support and not private action. Thus, to
continue or cut off funding for pagan temples and vestal virgins
was alternately argued to be the continuation of private bequests,
or the use of funds that had “long been deemed part of the public
treasury” and should be treated as coming from the emperor’s
“own funds.”107
In other cases, the contestation over what constituted public
and private concerned arenas, like the marketplace, that could be
seen as both, or neither. Commercial transactions had to proceed
through “authorized markets,” in which market participants were
required to “give specific divine honours to the Caesars.”108 Nor
was this the only restriction. Rather, as Gibbon wrote:
The innumerable deities and rites of polytheism were closely
interwoven with every circumstance of business or pleasure, of
public or of private life; and it seemed impossible to escape the
observance of them without at the same time renouncing the
commerce of mankind and all the offices and amusements of
society.109

The closer the connection between spaces such as the marketplace
and the rites and requirements of the dominant regime, the more
the dissenter in such a space “found himself encompassed with
infernal snares.”110 Similarly, occupations that we might today see
as public or private, but in which one’s private views might be seen
103
104
105
106
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108
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as irrelevant to the performance of those occupations, ended up
coming within the vortex of the power struggle, as with Julian’s
edict barring Christians from serving as teachers, which were not
public positions but were thought to raise public concerns about
the fitness of those who occupied them.111
These factors played out recurrently throughout the stages of
struggle for social, political, and cultural control between the
pagans and Christians. Given the nature of human conflict, it will
be no surprise that we can see the same thing playing out in our
own contemporary culture wars.
II. OFFER, COUNTEROFFER, AND POWER STRUGGLE
IN RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
Smith argues that current cultural struggles, particularly
those centering around the relationship between law and religion,
represent “a renewal of the fourth-century struggle between
Christianity and paganism.”112 He acknowledges that the parallel
he finds is necessarily a simplified picture, an “artificial imposition
upon a complex and messy reality,”113 and that his use of the
“pagan” label to describe a set of religious and cultural beliefs is
intended to be “provocative.”114 It will surely be treated as such,
and no doubt will produce much useful and thoughtful criticism,
as well as more questionable praise or scorn for his thesis
depending on one’s alliances in the culture wars.
In this Essay, I avoid directly disputing Smith’s language and
basic diagnosis. It is an important and seriously offered diagnosis,
not merely a clever rhetorical framing. It arguably “provide[s]
insights that more conventional accounts of our situation do
not,”115 and helps us see our own moment with a greater sense of
historical continuity rather than as something wholly new and
urgent. This is not simply a clever repackaging of a standard
account of the culture wars. In particular, Smith’s attempt to
understand and describe the values and assumptions of both
“pagan” and “Christian” worldviews, and his focus on the
distinction between transcendent and immanent understandings
of existence, are not simply echoes of a description of left versus
111
112
113
114
115
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right, liberty versus equality, tradition versus progress, or other
standard dichotomies. Whether his account is completely correct
or not—and there is surely much to question about it—it offers a
valuable new lens, one that does not entail enrolling in one camp
or the other or map neatly onto standard legal and political
divisions.
All that said, his basic description of the modern culture wars
will be familiar to those who toil in this field. Many of us have
attempted to understand the current state of religious liberty
through the lens of the culture wars.116 Smith’s modern parallel
to Pliny the Younger, the legal scholar Douglas Laycock, has
worried over these questions for some time.117 Readers familiar
with this literature will not be startled by the suggestion that “[t]he
contemporary fight over religious freedom is one battleground—a
central one, as it happens—in the larger and essentially religious
struggle to define and constitute America.”118
In this Part, I do not summarize all of Smith’s arguments or
relitigate individual cases and controversies in law and religion.
My goal instead is to draw on the factors identified in Part I and
see what additional details or insights they might add to this nowcommon way of understanding modern disputes—legal, scholarly,
and discursive—concerning religious liberty.
Smith’s fundamental point is that the culture war “was and
is a struggle for ‘domination’—for control of the cultural and
political community and the self-conception by which the
community constitutes and governs itself.”119 One “theater[ ]” in that
struggle involves the relationship between law, religion, and the
Constitution.120 It includes struggles over religious displays and
other “expressions of public religiosity.”121 But it also includes
116
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disputes over the accommodation of religion, an area in which we
see both increased controversy over particular claims to religious
accommodation and “rising opposition to religious accommodation”
itself.122
Much of this struggle centers around sex.123 Although one of
the leading controversial cases, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.,124 concerned women’s access to contraceptive care, no single
issue stands alone. The struggles accompanying Hobby Lobby,
and the argument about religious accommodation that surrounded
that case, were tied to the broader issue of gay rights and samesex marriage.125 Contestation over those issues, combined with the
constitutional recognition of same-sex marriage rights,126 has in
turn led to struggles over religious accommodation. This conflict
has most prominently manifested over the question of whether
businesses that provide allegedly artistic and personalized
services will be obliged to provide them for same-sex weddings and
similar celebrations.127 These have all been live issues for some
time,128 and before them came fights over contraception and
abortion. All of them are connected, not discrete, areas of cultural,
political, and legal contestation.129
That both sides see these as connected matters suggests that
this is not simply a matter of individual cases or issues. Rather,
what is at stake is a clash of worldviews. Each individual dispute
is part of a larger war, one in which “fundamental human rights”
122
Id. at 304, 316–18; see also Horwitz, Against Martyrdom, supra note 116, at
1302; Horwitz, Hobby Lobby, supra note 116, at 154–56.
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are opposed to a connected set of “grave evils.”130 To win any one
battle is insufficient. Although each side may with complete
sincerity view the stakes of any particular issue as high, much of
the fervor comes from the belief that the issue does not stand alone
and that defeat on one issue would portend disaster across a range
of others.131 Thus, the degree of fervor with which each issue is
debated often seems to outstrip the facts or immediate implications
of the dispute.132
All this is consistent with Smith’s basic thesis. As in the early
contests between the pagans and Christians, modern struggles
over law and religion, at least on cases with a salient culture-war
element, are at bottom a struggle for power involving a clash of
“competing sanctities.”133 As G.K. Chesterton put it, we face “a fight
of creeds masquerading as [a debate over] policies.”134
Through the pagan-Christian lens, Smith offers a novel
account of the contest over religious accommodation. Religious
accommodation is “an approach with a discernibly Christian
character.”135 This is true not just in a “genealogical” sense related
to the Christian roots of Western or American history.136 It is true
in a deeper “logical or structural” sense.137 “Christian” here means
not Christian belief or history alone but a particular conception of
religion as transcendent. Religious accommodation is thus seen as
support for the “recognition of a transcendent authority” separate
from, and at least equal to, any claims of authority made by the
“secular” state.138
Rendered in individualist terms in light of American religious
and political history, this transcendental vision of religious
accommodation translates to a view that “within wide bounds,”
individuals must be free “to judge what the transcendent truth and
130
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its corollary obligations might be,” and the state must “refrain
from interfering with—or, put positively, [must] accommodate—
matters within that jurisdiction over which the state ha[s] no
authority, or no ‘cognizance.’ ”139 The locus classicus of this view
in the American canon is Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance.
There, Madison argues that each person owes a duty to “the
Creator” that “is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of
obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.”140 Accordingly, where
religion is concerned, “no mans [sic] right is abridged by the
institution of Civil Society and . . . Religion is wholly exempt from
its cognizance.”141
By contrast, the modern “pagan” view, which supports a view
of the sacred as immanent in the world rather than transcendental,
rejects the view of “two cities,” heavenly and earthly, in favor of
“the city,” the “fully and exclusively sovereign city.”142 It is thus
“unwilling as a public matter to recognize or defer to any higher or
supposedly transcendent authority.”143 The “pagan” may well
support religious accommodation. But she will do so “not out of
deference to a higher authority, but out of solicitude”—as a matter
of respect not for the individual’s divine obligation, but for her
conscience.144 Even this view, which remained fairly strong until
recent years, is increasingly fragile today.
One need not fully agree with this account, even if one takes
as a given both Smith’s pagan-Christian framework and the
assertion that it is being played out again in a modern context.
Although I find Smith’s general framework intriguing, I am not
sure I find this specific account completely convincing. I am not
sure that a belief in a specific transcendent authority necessarily
translates into legal and political respect for “transcendent
religiosity” in general,145 or that Smith’s description of
accommodation as a belief that “government should respect
people’s religious commitments”146 requires much by way of
allegiance to either a transcendent or an immanent understanding
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of the world.147 Nor am I certain that a “pagan” belief in immanent
religiosity leads inexorably to hostility to accommodation, or that
all modern opposition to religious accommodation is based on a
rejection of the transcendent or an acceptance of immanent
religiosity. My own strong support for religious accommodation is
closer to what Smith describes as a position of religious and “civic
agnosticism,” under which the fact that religious claimants “might be
right” in claiming an overriding duty to a creator deserves to be taken
seriously.148 That argument for accommodation is particularly
strong if one also holds a legal pluralist view that the state is only
one form of authority, one form of constitutive institution, and that
its reach should not be endless and effectively extinguish
competing authorities.149
For present purposes, however, while noting my reservations,
I do not attempt to show Smith is wrong, let alone that I am right.
Rather, my focus here is on the struggle for power in the area of
religious exercise, and the relevance of the factors noted in Part I
in enriching our understanding of that struggle.
The starting point here is the basic thesis that each
dispensation does not simply seek immediate victory. Rather, the
relationship between the contending sides is a play of proposed
compromises, each reasonable from its own perspective but failing
“fully to grasp and credit the other side’s commitments,”150 and
their concomitant rejection, leading to the cycle of reaction and
counter-reaction that is precisely what makes culture wars so
intractable.

147
I also have some doubts about whether a Christian understanding of religious
transcendence necessarily requires the law to “respect” competing religious
obligations. For relevant argument, see Jud Campbell, Judicial Review and the
Enumeration of Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 588–89 (2017) (arguing that
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Taking as a given Smith’s account of religious accommodation
as a “Christian” position, if not all its details, the demand for
accommodation seems eminently reasonable, a request for small
sacrifices. It follows a simple principle:
[G]overnment should affirmatively try to leave space for people
to live in accordance with their diverse understandings of the
sacred. So if a particular law would require a person or group to
violate a sincerely held religious commitment, then a just and
humane government will, if reasonably possible (because
sometimes it will not be reasonably possible), find ways to excuse
compliance by those people whose religion would be burdened.151

This does not seem much to ask. Indeed, it is reasonable by
definition. It allows for accommodation but acknowledges others’
rights and interests. Depending on its terms, a state religious
accommodation statute may expand the rights of potential
claimants but will not license absolutely anything.152 A legislative
accommodation excusing a closely held company from direct
compliance with the contraceptive mandate may be statutorily and
constitutionally permissible but it will take place in the context of
“an existing, recognized, workable, and already-implemented
[government] framework to provide coverage” to female employees
of that company seeking contraceptive coverage.153 Rights of
refusal to provide personalized services for same-sex weddings will
be available, as they may in other cases where the vendor of such
services strongly objects to endorsing a particular message or
view, but, ex hypothesi, “the services offered by these professionals
[will be] readily available from other providers, and . . . no sensible
same-sex couple would actually want the services of a provider
who is religiously opposed to their union.”154 Even if one takes
seriously and respectfully the claim that accommodation in each of
these cases works a dignitary or even some tangible harm, it is
possible to understand that from the perspective of the
pro-accommodation side, these requests may be thought of as
reasonable, limited in scope, and requiring only small sacrifices
from the other side. That may be especially true in light of the

151

Id. at 305 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 317.
153
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 537 U.S. 682, 737–38 (2014) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
154
SMITH, supra note 1, at 301.
152

2019]

A FEW GRAINS OF INCENSE

153

stakes as perceived by that side: the need to obey “a higher law or
obligation—something like the law of God—that is independent
both of government and of [the claimant’s] own preferences.”155
One can say exactly the same thing about the offered
compromise from the perspective of the “pagan” dispensation. From
that perspective, there is no doubt that invidious discrimination
against religion is unconstitutional and wrong. In that sense, the
legal default is respect for religion, transcendent or otherwise, not
opposition to it.156 And many religious accommodation claims
will—at least for many “pagans” or modern constitutionalists—be
respected as a matter of conscience, as a matter of equal treatment
for people of different creeds, cultures, and so on, or as a
reasonable legislative effort to respect pluralism and diversity. All
that will be asked of the religious claimant is to respect and obey
the law like any other citizen, after all the considerations of a
“tolerant and humane community” have been taken into account.157
The religious citizen will be asked not to discriminate against
others on the basis of certain protected categories and not to
disobey laws—public accommodations laws, nondiscrimination
laws, laws ensuring the provision of basic contraceptive services—
that embody fundamental national commitments. Those laws will
still leave ample room for nonparticipation, in an individual or
“private” capacity, with views and individuals one considers
objectionable. The wedding cake vendor will be required to sell
cakes to same-sex couples but not to open a wedding cake store in
the first place or attend same-sex weddings on her own time.
In that light, any sacrifices demanded of the religious objector
again seem small. As with the accommodationist or “Christian”
compromise, the sacrifices involved will be even more reasonable
in light of the stakes: the constitutional and moral values of
equality and dignity, especially for disadvantaged or vulnerable
groups that have long been treated unequally by law and society.
From the perspective of the group being offered the
compromise, the reaction will be very different. Take the offer made
by the “pagan” dispensation. From the perspective of a secular
thinker, the legal regime merits obedience as the product of public
reason and democratic deliberation. No other model is “credible
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for anyone of a critical and informed disposition.”158 While the
state ought to “respect and promote” religion and religious liberty,
any claimed religious authority is still “subordinate to the
authority of the state.”159 Thus, the rejection of religious
accommodation—when, in a given case, it is ultimately rejected—
should be the end of the matter. From the perspective of a
religious integralist, for whom religion imbricates every action and
the state is the newcomer, with an imperfect and ultimately
secondary claim to authority, we can expect a very different
response.
Conversely, from the “pagan” perspective, the “Christian”
offer of a regime of religious accommodation can easily be viewed
as involving a claim of the right to become “a law unto himself,”160
regardless of the sincerity of the assertion that one is obeying a
duty imposed from on high and not simply serving one’s own
desires. In both cases, not only will the premise that the sacrifice
involved is small be hard to understand or accept; the stakes
involved for each will make it even harder to accept the terms that
have been offered.
This is one part of the story. Just as important is the point
emphasized throughout Smith’s book: that what is at issue is not
simply a set of offered and rejected compromises but a struggle for
dominance. Each side seeks to be the regime making the offer
rather than the group faced with the hard and not entirely
voluntary choice of taking it, or of rejecting it and facing the threat
of punishment or lawless status. Although the contest involves
elections and judicial nominations rather than regicide or
revolution, Twitter rather than torture,161 its existence is no less
plain.
This is one way to understand two closely related but
seemingly conflicting facts. On the one hand, it is widely agreed
that the rhetorical pitch and volume of contemporary rhetoric over
law, religion, and politics in the culture-war arena have become
158
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nasty, polarized, ill-tempered, and accusatory. Both sides are
routinely accused of intolerance.162 The language of bigotry is
regularly invoked to marginalize the other side as irrationally and
invidiously refusing the offered compromise.163 Arguments on both
sides are pursued with “evangelical zeal” and seemingly little
regard for “sober appeal[s] to facts.”164 This does not describe
everyone in our society,165 but it is characteristic of many of the
loudest and most active voices in the debate. Those voices in turn
may “make it harder than it once was to remain neutral or
undecided.”166 Those who take such a position may constitute a
large if diffuse percentage of the population, but they are
marginalized in public debate, represented by no interest group or
political party.
On the other hand, the fierceness of the debate and the
heightened nature of the rhetoric can obscure the fact that both
sides agree on a great many things. As Smith notes, “Virtually
everyone at least purports to be in favor of religious freedom.”167
Although the meaning of that term may be contested and an
increasing number of voices may question it altogether, it is still
true that in many cases, agreement is widespread and sincere.
Conversely, virtually every advocate of religious accommodation
agrees that the kinds of things that critics of accommodation worry
about—especially racial discrimination—fall outside the realm of
“reasonable” accommodation168 and should be opposed. Thus,
many scholars who criticize religious accommodation joined the
broad coalitions that came together to support the religious
claimant in the prisoner case Holt v. Hobbs.169 And many of those
162
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who support religious accommodation make a point of
emphasizing that they support racial antidiscrimination law, and
take great pains to distinguish it from modern cases involving
accommodation in other areas.170 Finally, and despite growing
disagreements about religious accommodation, both those who
unapologetically favor it and those who are dubious but
acknowledge that there are cases where it is appropriate agree
that there are limits to what can be accommodated.171
Increasingly, that position is categorized as falling on the
“pagan” side and described in terms of harm to third parties,
including dignitary harms.172 But accommodationists, too, insist
that there are cases in which it is not “reasonably possible . . . to
excuse compliance [with generally applicable laws] by those people
whose religion would be burdened.”173 Those limits may not be put
expressly in terms of harm to third parties or dignitary harms.
But the practical limits agreed upon by accommodationists can
often be understood in those terms.174 And on the other side of the
ledger, there are cases in which both sides differ as to the reasons
but agree that the state should accommodate the religious
objector. Although the Vietnam draft exemption cases175 can
rightly be understood as marking a “subtle transition” in the views
of the “pagan” party, in which conscience becomes equal or
superior to religion as a ground for accommodation,176 they can
also be read as indicating an area of continuity in which most
people on both sides support—albeit for different reasons—the
long-standing tradition of exempting peaceful and sincere
religious groups like the Quakers from certain generally
applicable obligations.177
170
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What to make of this curious combination: a wide area of
agreement, and an increasingly shrill focus on areas of
disagreement, with each side accusing the other of being
intolerant and unreasonable despite the fact that both sides seem
able to agree on at least some basic rules and limits? It can
perhaps best be understood as lending support to the basic thesis
that what is occurring is not simply a struggle over outcomes or
even ideas but rather is fundamentally a struggle for control, a
“larger and essentially religious struggle to define and constitute
America.”178 As with the original pagan-Christian conflict, it can
be understood not as a rejection of the very idea of compromise but
as a power struggle over who will occupy the high ground and thus
set the terms of the compromise: to determine who gets to make
the offer and who must take it. On this view, it is beside the point
that there may be areas of practical agreement despite
fundamental differences of worldview. What matters is who gets
to shape the offer, to judge whether the other side has complied
with it or conversely is subject to the “logic of persecution,” and to
determine the boundaries and bases of what constitutes an
“unreasonable” accommodation of religion. Neither side may be
hostile either to religion or to values such as equality and
dignity.179 But both understand that it makes all the difference
who gets to define those terms and their application. It matters
who gets to define the values that constitute the American “city”
itself.
From this perspective, it follows that we will see a rejection of
what, from the perspective of each side, seems like reasonable
compromises and small sacrifices: the modern equivalents of “a
few grains of incense.” This perspective, rather than reinforcing
the view that one or both sides are being harsh and unreasonable,
may encourage a greater degree of understanding and sympathy
for each side and (up to a point, anyway) for the heated nature of
its rhetoric. Each side’s rejection of the other will stem not from
sheer malice but from the failure “fully to grasp and credit the
other side’s commitments.”180
As we saw earlier, however, a compromise offer is not a singleshot game. It is a dynamic process, involving a series of moves
and reactions that ultimately nudge each side toward the logic of
178
179
180
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persecution. Each side understands that behind an offer of
compromise—often, for both sides, a compromise that involves
some degree of religious accommodation but within certain
limits—stands a larger worldview. Each side seeks to name and
to control the values of the larger society—or the “city,” as Smith
calls it, with a backward glance to Rome and to Augustine’s
account of the earthly and heavenly cities.
As the renewed coalition of groups in cases like Holt v. Hobbs
or the hoasca case181 suggests, there may be cases in which both
sides are willing to work together despite their larger
disagreements, at least as long as their opposing worldviews are
obscured by the technical language of legal doctrine. But when the
disputes approach the heart of those differing worldviews and the
values they hold dear—often centering around sexuality and thus
making perspicuous different views about morality, the nature of
personhood, and the position of the state on these matters—
coexistence takes a back seat to conflict.
Even where the proffered compromise is acceptable, each side
will suspect, with good reason, that the larger goal is the
ascendancy of a comprehensive worldview—“Christian” or
“pagan,” in Smith’s terms, or “transcendent” or “immanent,” but
more commonly described with terms like “secular” or “religious,”
“conservative” or “progressive”—that, once it has the commanding
heights, will not stop there. So it may reject even an acceptable
compromise. That rejection will be viewed as unreasonable. The
conclusion that it is unreasonable will lead to the conclusion that
the refusal can only be understood as a product of bigotry or
hostility. Thus, Martin Castro, chairman of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, asserted that “[t]he phrases ‘religious
liberty’ and ‘religious freedom,’ ” which we can here understand to
stand in for the accommodationist position, “will stand for nothing
except hypocrisy so long as they remain code words for discrimination,
intolerance, racism, sexism, homophobia, Islamophobia, Christian
supremacy or any form of intolerance.”182 And the other side will
see not a reasonable set of limitations on religious exercise, but an
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outright “war on religion.”183 These kinds of reactions will beget
counter-reactions and escalations in rhetoric and action. And so
the cycle goes.
It is easy to understand why each side may reject the
compromise offered by the other side, especially as long as an
implicit premise is that one side has the power to make or
withdraw the offer and to set the terms of what is reasonable or
not. Once that happens, it is equally easy to understand why the
two sides will move farther apart and be increasingly likely to
attribute bad faith and “unshakeable obstinacy”184 to each other.
If each side embodies a significantly different worldview in which
different values are defined or prioritized differently, and in which
the very question of whether we live in “one city” or two is at issue,
it is understandable that each side will perceive the other as
wanting a “total win,”185 and that each side will be incentivized to
seek a total win.
One last and increasingly important factor is worth noting. It
may be seen as following naturally from the logic of each side’s
worldview and values, or as a strategic part of the power struggle.
Indeed, given that even strategic choices can be sincere and that
even calculated moves by individual strategists may quickly be
absorbed into the sincerely held worldview of a larger group, it will
often be both.
This is the struggle, one that we saw in the historical
Christian-pagan contest, to define the scope of what is “public” or
“private” and thus subject to greater or lesser forms of regulation.
It is a contest over the boundaries of the walls of the “city.”186 As
we saw in Part I, historically much of this debate involved the
rituals or “small sacrifices” that could be imposed as a condition
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for entry into the marketplace and other common spaces, around
the fitness of pagans or Christians for particular offices, and
around public symbols.
Today, this battle often involves the expansion of the
“public sphere” through public accommodations laws. As Smith
acknowledges, both accommodationists and their opponents have
often understood certain spaces, such as the marketplace, “to have
both public and private dimensions.”187 As I noted above,
accommodationists have long argued, both on sincere grounds and
as a matter of demonstrating the reasonableness of their own
proferred compromise, that racial discrimination should be
understood as a public concern subject to regulation. As other
issues, such as same-sex marriage, have moved to the forefront, the
logic that supported public accommodations laws prohibiting
racial discrimination has extended to issues in which more
members of the “Christian” party, as Smith defines it, will find
themselves in conflict with the law. Those whose “religious views
conflict with” these expanded “public policies” will thus face new
restrictions on their ability to act consistently with those views in
“the domain of business, or economic activity.”188
The current primary example is the set of cases involving
services for same-sex wedding ceremonies, such as wedding cakes
or photography. With a little imagination, one can have sympathy
for each side’s perspective. From the “Christian” or transcendent
religious perspective, the choices involved are “private” in
important senses and were treated as such until recently. They
involve new issues not previously faced by these vendors, who did
not set up in the marketplace with any particular intention of
refusing services as such, and thus naturally give rise to new
dilemmas and sometimes new refusals to provide services. They
often involve services that are readily available from other
vendors, who are eager to provide them for both commercial and
conscience-driven reasons. Even if the business owner attempts
to “be delicate and respectful in expressing [her] religious
reservations”189 and offers to provide every possible service except
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the one that most centrally implicates her religious beliefs,190 she
may find herself either forced into compliance despite her religious
views or squeezed out of business.
From the “pagan” or “immanent” perspective, one can
understand why the idea that the business owner’s choice is
wholly private seems absurd. On this view, the marketplace has
long been understood as having “both public and private
dimensions,” and we have long insisted that it comply with basic
values of nondiscrimination. Those values have been logically and
democratically expanded to include new categories. A business
owner who balks at this will be viewed as suddenly rejecting a law
she has long been required, and willing, to follow. The conclusion
that such refusals cause serious harms to dignity and equality—
harms that outweigh the relatively trivial desire not to provide the
same services that the business owner has offered to countless
others—will be logically “understandable” and “plausible.”191
Given the reasonableness of each of these competing
perspectives, it is understandable that both sides have fought over
the definition of public and private, through both the expansion of
public accommodation statutes and the passage of religious
freedom legislation that provides carve-outs in some of these new
areas. It makes sense that each side, viewing the other as engaged
in an imperial move to define the line between public and private
and thus the boundaries of the “city,” will be unyielding in its
opposition to the other.
All of this resembles the struggle Smith describes as having
taken place over the marketplace and other common spaces in
ancient Rome. There, too, public customs, values, and laws
“permeated Roman imperial society,” making it impossible to
separate the values and rites of the ruling regime “from
entertainment, from commerce, from governance, . . . and so on.”192
Then as now, the argument that the religious objector could
simply choose not to run a business might seem unconvincing,
particularly as the scope of what constituted an “authorized
market,” subject to rules informed by the values of the regnant
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regime, expanded.193 From our vantage point, we can understand
why rules of conduct in the marketplace that seemed minor to the
pagan dispensation would feel to Christians like a set of “infernal
snares.”194
Similarly, we saw earlier that one of the most “controversial
measure[s]” advanced by Julian was his insistence that Christian
teachers be banned from teaching because their lack of belief in
the gods made them “morally unfit to teach the classics.”195 Such
an edict would be perfectly logical from the pagan perspective.
How could someone do a proper job as a teacher if she rejected the
values required for the proper education of the city’s youth? The
restriction could also be viewed as reasonable because Christians
could still do plenty of other jobs.
We could easily imagine a “milder” version of this rule. Julian
could have allowed Christians to teach the classics—provided that
they taught the classical texts, and expressed the values and
beliefs voiced by those texts, in the same way that a pagan teacher
who shared those values would. Doubtless, just as some
Christians were willing to cast “a few grains of incense” on the
altar in order to participate in Roman life, some Christians would
have accepted this bargain. But it is equally obvious that for
many, this would be an unacceptable compromise and little
different from the harsher edict promulgated by Julian.
The modern equivalent can be found in an increasingly active
area of contestation: that involving occupational training and
licensing. Of course Christians, or members of any other faith,
transcendent or otherwise, are not prohibited from teaching or
other jobs because they are Christian. But as the codes and
practices of many professions, either directly or through state
regulation, take on more explicitly the values of the ruling regime,
new conflicts arise under which it may be difficult both to live and
act in a way that is consistent with certain religious beliefs and to
continue practicing as a doctor, a pharmacist, a lawyer, or, to bring
us full circle, a teacher.196
In sum, even if one has doubts about Smith’s characterization
of the modern “pagan” and “Christian” perspectives on religious
exercise, his broad point seems apt. These are not simply disputes
193
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about individual cases or topics. Nor, despite areas in which both
sides support religious accommodation and despite the general
absence of outright hostility to religion, can these disputes be
resolved by appeals to “reason” or compromise. Each side at least
starts with a willingness to compromise. But the nature of the
compromise offered by each, and the underlying values and
assumptions that ground it, are different in each case.
As highly salient culture-war issues arise, it is the differences
and not the common ground that will draw attention. The cycle of
rejection, reaction, and accusation that follows from these
differences will encourage both sides to reject the idea of
compromise, unless and until they are in a position to set its terms.
Given their fears that the other side disrespects their way of life
or fundamental beliefs, they will find coexistence plausible and
attractive only once they believe their existence itself is not under
threat. That will require them to occupy the seat of power: to
“control . . . the cultural and political community and the selfconception by which the community constitutes and governs
itself,”197 and thus the values and terms under which any “peaceful
coexistence” takes place. This fight for control of the city will
inevitably involve a struggle to define the very boundaries of that
city: what constitutes the “private” space in which people are free
to believe and act as they please, and what is “public” and subject
to the public values and rules of the dominant regime.
It is hardly surprising, then, that free exercise and the
accommodation of religion have become increasingly hotly
contested issues, and that these issues can be understood not as
discrete disputed issues but as a larger power struggle that closely
resembles, even if it is not identical to, the historical contest
between pagans and Christians.
Smith argues that struggles over free exercise and religious
accommodation can be understood not just in terms of practical
effects but also as a symbolic war in which accommodation is “a
constitutive symbol” that represents a vision of the kind of
transcendently religious community that “America is.”198 Of course,
one can just as readily understand arguments against
accommodation in symbolic terms, as a statement about the
fundamental values that characterize the American community
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and its laws. It is not surprising, then, that another battleground,
both in the ancient past and today, is over religious and other
symbols themselves. I turn to that issue next.
III. STRUGGLES TO DEFINE THE COMMUNITY:
NON-ESTABLISHMENT AND RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS
It is a commonplace observation that much of the action in
Establishment Clause litigation over the past several decades has
shifted from questions of funding to questions of public symbols.199
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on neutrality and equal access to
funding, developed over a series of cases and subject to certain
lingering caveats, seems to have attained a level of stability on
the Court and to have lessened some of the heat in funding
controversies.200 Unlike the state of affairs during the Founding
Era, “the prevailing judicial and scholarly consensus seems to
be that government-sponsored religious messages are more
problematic than government funding of religion and, more
broadly, that expressive harms are the chief harms with which the
Establishment Clause should be concerned.”201
Doctrinal stability is unlikely to hold where it is at odds with
social conditions and the state of public argument. Thus, it is
unlikely that the relative clarity of these cases is the cause of this
consensus. More likely, it reflects underlying differences between
conditions during the height of debate over funding in the past
199

See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa
Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L.
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For discussion, see generally Douglas Laycock, Churches, Playgrounds,
Government Dollars—and Schools?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 133 (2017). The most recent
cases in this line are Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25
(2017), which held that Missouri could not bar a church school from equal
participation in a funding program providing grants to ensure safer playground
surfaces, and Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 207 L. Ed. 2d 679 (2020),
in which the Court held that religious schools could not be excluded from a state
program supporting private school scholarships despite Montana’s asserted interest
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see, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002), and an emphasis on the
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century and conditions today, such as the decline of open combat
between Protestants and Catholics.202 Whatever the reason, there
is more controversy over government religious symbols than over
government funding of religion.
We might think of struggles over religious symbols in terms of
competing dispensations, and the compromises offered by each
side and accepted or refused by the other. If modern debates, like
the ancient one, constitute a struggle for “control of the cultural
and political community and the self-conception by which the
community constitutes and governs itself,”203 we can expect that
struggle to play out in the area of religious symbols just as it has
with religious accommodation. Indeed, such a struggle seems not
only possible but likely. “[I]n the struggle to define America,
symbols and discourse are crucial.”204 Thus, each side—Christian
and pagan, religious and secular, liberal and conservative, or
however one wishes to frame the divide—will “struggle[ ] to
monopolize the symbols of legitimacy” in our society.205
Smith examines “three partly overlapping theaters of that
struggle” for “mastery within the city”: “symbols or expressions of
public religiosity, public recognition and ratification of the norms
of sexuality, and the Constitution itself.”206 In this Part, I focus
primarily on public religious symbols, and briefly on disputes over
the meaning of “the Constitution itself.” I again work from within
Smith’s framework. I find it useful for understanding the current
state of debate but also raise questions about his precise treatment
of these issues. More so than in the last part, I find much to
question here. Even if one accepts Smith’s acknowledgment that
his interpretation is necessarily “an artificial imposition upon a
complex and messy reality,” there are reasons to worry that the
reality is too messy to bear the interpretation he imposes on it.207
Before raising those questions, however, it would be helpful first
to set out Smith’s interpretation.
For Smith, the culture wars form the context in which these
struggles play out in the modern era. They arose after a period of
relative common ground on religion and its relation to the
202
See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment
Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 641–42 (2011).
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prevailing culture: a period stretching from the Founding Era to
the mid-to-late twentieth century, in which there was a “prevalent
public philosophy or national self-understanding” that our nation
and its symbols were “pervasively if sometimes amorphously
Christian in . . . culture and substance.”208 This understanding
was the basis of what Robert Bellah calls the “American civil
religion.”209 The “guiding narrative” provided by the American
civil religion drew heavily on the Bible, starting with the
Protestant understanding of Scripture and expanding over time
to include Catholic and Jewish visions as well.210 All these
understandings were grounded in “a transcendent religiosity.”211
In that sense, notwithstanding the increasing move away
from sectarianism and toward “an increasingly inclusive civil
religion,” this dispensation was “Christian” in the broad sense in
which Smith uses it in this book.212 Like other dispensations we
have seen, it did not seek to eliminate whatever a “pagan” or
“immanent” religiosity would include by way of symbols and public
rituals and displays. But the idea that “[w]e are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being”213 was still the
starting point. Any tolerance for or positive inclusion of immanent
or pagan symbols was based on the implicit requirement that the
minority accept the dominant transcendent vision, or at least
accept its manifestation in public statements, displays, and
rituals.
The “dissolution of this guiding narrative” led to a state of
division between “two broad and contending camps.”214 One
“maintained continuity with the old, biblically oriented civil
religion, while the [other] challenged it.”215 The struggle between
them “for control of the cultural and political community” is what
we now describe as the modern culture wars.216 Given that this is
a contest to establish which understanding will constitute “the
character of [our] community,” it is unsurprising that “the culture
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wars have been in large measure a struggle to control public
symbols.”217 We have not come far from the contest over symbols,
such as the dispute over the Altar of Victory, that formed a major
part of the war for mastery over the Roman city.
Typically, this dispute is treated as a contest between
“supporters of ‘religious’ symbols and expressions” and “proponents
of a ‘secular’ public square.”218 Smith offers a different take. That
take rests on his excavation of the “Christian” and “pagan”
dispensations, broadly understood, and his effort to show that they
continue in existence under the “religious” and “secular” labels.
The continued relevance of the ancient dispute between
dispensations becomes apparent once we take into account “the
ambiguous or equivocal character of the term ‘secular’ ” and the
“transcendent” and “immanent conceptions of ‘religion.’ ”219
If the traditional or “Christian” understanding of our
community is one of transcendent authority, the competing “pagan”
understanding emphasizes immanent or “inner-worldly sources of
moral authority.”220 On this view, rather than a stark contrast
between “religious” and “secular” views of the public square, we
actually have a contest between a position favoring “Christian” or
transcendent public religious displays and messages, and a “pagan”
or immanent view. We should understand the modern pagan camp
as holding two positions. The first is one of increasing resistance
to “transcendent public religious symbols.”221 The second position
is not one of opposition to government symbols and government
expression as such. Any community will inevitably want its
government to say something about “who we are, or what kind of
community we live in.”222 Rather, it is one that permits only those
government symbols that are consistent with an immanent or
pagan understanding of religiosity.
Here, Smith does two useful and important things. The first
influences the second and leads to something of a change of
position from earlier work. First, he examines and rejects the
argument that we have paid too much attention to the dispute over
symbols.223 That argument suggests that the heat of the dispute
217
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is disproportionate to its actual importance—they are just
symbols, after all—and that our time, attention, and resources
might “be better spent on matters that actually affect people in
coercive or material ways.”224
Of course, one answer is that we just do care about public
symbols and messages. But there is good reason to do so. We live
in a constructed social and political community, in which much of
the construction work is done by symbols—not least public
symbols, which are “expressive and constitutive not just of
particular private speakers or groups, but of the community.”225
Disputes over these questions are existential, not trivial.226 To
borrow the title of a recent book, fights about what our public
symbols and expressions will include or exclude are ultimately “a
war for the soul of America.”227
This leads Smith to a second conclusion. In this book, he takes
a much more sympathetic position on a major area of contestation
in Establishment Clause law: the meaning and value of the
so-called “endorsement test,” which asks whether a government
message involving religion treats some Americans as “outsiders”
or “not full members of the political community.”228 In previous
work, Smith has criticized that test as “doctrinally deficient and
without theoretical justification.”229 He has argued that a
pluralistic culture cannot possibly ensure that everyone feels like
an insider, and that because the inevitability of alienation from at
least some government actions or messages “is inherent in a
pluralistic culture, the aspiration to abolish that phenomenon, or
to develop a conception of ‘political standing’ that includes a right
not to feel like an ‘outsider,’ constitutes a utopian vision rather
than a realistic basis for formulating constitutional doctrine.”230
Indeed, because the full version of the endorsement test casts
224
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doubt on the very reasonableness of the loser in a religious symbol
case, that test, which “[sets] out to avoid alienation and offense to
real human beings, . . . ends up adding insult to injury.”231
Here, however, Smith’s acknowledgment of the constitutive
importance of symbols, and thus the legitimate nature of the
struggle for control over those symbols, leads him to a more
sympathetic treatment of the “no endorsement” idea. If American
civil religion is a vital part of who we are, then debates over
religious displays by government are about more than the kinds of
“potentially divisive political issues” that arise every time
government takes a position, and thus create winners or losers,
with a normal but not constitutionally significant sense of
alienation.232 In a statement that surely is meant to include
himself, Smith concludes, “[I]n this sense, as Justice O’Connor
perceived but her critics sometimes did not, [public] religious
expressions may have a more fundamental alienating effect than
other sorts of controversial public statements typically have.”233
Armed with this sympathy for the seriousness of the claims on
both sides of the fight over religious symbols, Smith offers a thesis
about the precise nature of that dispute and its treatment by the
courts. Building on his definitions of “secular” and “religious” and
his distinction between transcendent and immanent religion,
Smith suggests that “the current struggle over public symbols
turns out to be more complicated than it initially appears. In
prohibiting endorsements of ‘religion,’ the ‘no endorsement’
doctrine might mean that government is forbidden to endorse
traditional or transcendent religion. Conversely, ‘secular’
expressions of more immanent religiosity might be permissible.”234
According to this thesis, “conventionally ‘religious’ public
symbols and expressions,” such as “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance, might be forbidden.235 But a host of other public
symbols and expressions would remain: a religiously denuded
version of the Pledge, the American flag, the national anthem, and
so on.236 These symbols are not merely “secular.” They “still
231
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seek . . . to stir citizens’ feelings of reverence and devotion” and
serve “a sacralizing or consecrating function.”237 The Court shows
no signs of objection to this sort of “this-worldly sacralization.”238
Traces of sacralization appear in various decisions, such as Justice
Brennan’s statement in Texas v. Johnson that the flag is “virtually
sacred to our nation as a whole.”239 In short, the Court has
“embraced, wittingly or unwittingly, a conception of the political
community formed in immanently religious terms.”240 Where the
Court does permit religious symbols or language, it is most likely
to do so when those expressions “are at least susceptible of being
interpreted in more immanent or this-worldly terms.”241 The
result “is to remove the transcendent or Christian stratum of
American civil religion, thereby leaving the immanent or pagan
substratum.”242
This is an intriguing reinterpretation of the culture wars over
public religious expression. Although it will require an imaginative
stretch for many readers, it is not without support. It is true that
the more openly sectarian a governmental expression is, the less
likely it is to be upheld: and a sectarian expression, at least given
the long history of Christianity in the United States, is more likely
to be a transcendent one. It is also true that the kinds of
government religious expressions with which the Court is most
comfortable are rendered acceptable in part by treating them as
having “lost their religious significance” and serving a more
general solemnizing function.243 That does not necessarily make
such statements expressions of immanent religiosity. But it can
be read as suggesting that whatever form of ostensibly “religious”
sacralization is permitted, it does not include openly and explicitly
transcendent forms of religiosity.
Finally, it is clearly true that many forms of “civil religion”
broadly understood—on which I have more to say below—are
treated as uncontroversial by “Christians” and “pagans” alike.
Thus, despite a polemical attack on any form of American civil
religion that is openly religious and a purported rejection of “civil
religion” tout court, Frederick Gedicks asserts that “[o]ne can fall
237
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in love with human dignity, with freedom of speech, with equal
opportunity, and even with the separation of church and state.”244
Although he describes this position as “abandoning the religious
part [of civil religion] and retaining the civil part,”245 it is hard to
describe this position as nonreligious, at least in Smith’s terms,
and possible (although not necessary, as I argue below shortly) to
think of it in terms of immanent religiosity.
So there is something to Smith’s heterodox account. One
might round it out by asking the same questions I pursued in the
first two parts of this Essay: What does the dispute over religious
symbols and expressions look like from the perspective of
competing dispensations? And what compromises or offers does
each side make to the other from the commanding heights that it
occupies, or seeks to occupy? A relatively simple story can be told
here.
For the “Christian” or “transcendent” dispensation, the
entrenchment of transcendent religious symbols does not demand
the elimination of competing secular or immanent symbols. For
one thing, both Christians and pagans are free to worship, as it
were, at the altar of common-ground symbols such as the flag or the
Constitution. Civil religion itself, even if it remains transcendent,
can be expanded to include a wider set of “communions”: mostly
monotheistic, perhaps, but even that might be subject to
negotiation.246 Indeed, Smith writes that “a central feature of any
contemporary Christian society under conditions of modern
pluralism is that it is unlikely to sponsor any official account of
what transcendence is and requires—any official orthodoxy.”247
Finally, from the perspective of the “Christian” dispensation, the
244
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pagan is free to ignore the public religious symbol or
expression. Any obligations are limited to mere courtesies, such
as standing, or unobtrusively staying seated at a public event, not
as a form of obeisance but out of simple good manners.248
This resembles, and is even less burdensome than, the ancient
pagan suggestion that Christians who wanted to be good citizens
need merely sprinkle a few grains of incense on the altar at public
ceremonies without having to change their religious beliefs. Like
that compromise, however, as Smith recognizes, such public
expressions “may have a more fundamental alienating effect” than
the offeror recognizes, and thus one may anticipate resistance to
even a mild form of truly religious and transcendent civil
religion.249
For the “pagan” or “immanent” dispensation, the fact that
transcendent religious symbols or displays are forbidden to
government does not mean they must be eliminated from the
public square, let alone the private sphere. Churches and religious
individuals need not hide the Light under a bushel. Their
architecture, signs, and statements can be as prominent and
transcendently religious as they please. They can, if they wish,
imbue immanently sacred “secular” symbols with transcendent
religiosity. If pagans and Christians alike can “fall in love with”
the display of the Constitution at the National Archives, then
Christians can go further and see in it the guiding hand of
Providence. At least in the United States, it is unlikely that the
rise of immanence and decline of transcendence will forbid
government workers from wearing yarmulkes, turbans, hijabs, or
crucifixes, as other governments have advocated.250 Leaving aside
the most ardent separationists, whose arguments are routinely
rejected by judges, many pagans would agree that a political
candidate or office-holder can even make deeply religious, but
officially personal, public statements. In exchange for this
largesse, “Christians” must merely accept that the symbols and
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messages of their deepest commitments are permanently barred
from taking a place in our array of public symbols and rituals.
They must give up the Altar of Victory.
From the pagan perspective, that is not asking much. But
given the depth of commitment of some religious believers, their
view that they are uniquely shut out from expressing some beliefs
through official public action, along with the fact that such
symbols “help to constitute and define the community” of which
they are a part, makes it understandable that they may resist this
settlement.251 Thus, the story Smith tells about religious symbols,
like his story of religious accommodation, can indeed be told in
terms of competing Christian and pagan dispensations, the
compromises each would offer, and the reasons each side might
reject that offer, which in turn encourages the dynamic of conflict
described above.
I have thus far offered a mostly descriptive and fairly
supportive description of Smith’s argument. I have suggested that
his account of disputes over public religious symbols is consistent
with his larger narrative of a contest between would-be pagan and
Christian dispensations and that this account has some power to
illuminate our current disputes. That said, I am much more
dubious about this account than I am about his application of the
same framework to the accommodation debate. There is nothing
wrong as such with “an artificial imposition” of an interpretation
“upon a complex and messy reality.”252 But too schematic or
artificial a vision may lend more coherence to events and ideas
than is warranted, and thus offer a false sense of clarity. I worry
that this may be true here. I explore this concern in two steps,
first asking questions about the “civil religion” framework that
animates much of Smith’s discussion and then asking directly
about the law of public religious symbols.
“Civil religion” is a complex term with no single definition.253
In broad terms, it can be said to “refer[ ] to the widely held body of
beliefs that are tied to the nation’s history and destiny. Although
it possesses no formal creed, it is a kind of generic faith that relates
the political society as well as the individual citizen to the realm

251

SMITH, supra note 1, at 273.
Id. at 259.
253
See Ellis M. West, A Proposed Neutral Definition of Civil Religion, 22 J.
CHURCH & STATE 23, 23 (1980) (“The voluminous literature on civil religion indicates
that the term has a multiplicity of meanings.”).
252

174

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 58:125

of ultimate meaning and existence.254 But what it means to call it
a “faith,” and how to define the term “civil” or identify the nature
of the “religiosity” at work, are fraught questions.255
Smith’s discussion of civil religion adopts the definition
employed by Robert Bellah: “that religious dimension, found I
think in the life of every people, through which it interprets its
historical experience in the light of transcendent reality.”256 This
is a reasonable choice: Berger is one of the most influential writers
on civil religion, and his definition is widely used. His work is also
conveniently congenial to Smith’s thesis. Drawing on Bellah’s
definition allows Smith to emphasize the idea of civil religion as
grounded in “a transcendent religiosity.”257 He notes that Berger’s
definition supports the transcendent understanding of religion
because it is based on “a species of Christianity, or at least a
biblically based form of public religion.”258
Berger’s is not the only available understanding of civil
religion, however.259 For one thing, civil religion includes not only
religious ceremonies that have been woven into the fabric of our
national identity but also nonreligious ceremonies and concepts—
a whole “system of rituals, symbols, values, norms, and
allegiances”—that help invest our national identity with common
254
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ties of creedal and sentimental significance.260 A more secular and
immanent vision of civil religion defines it as a “democratic
egalitarian faith,” under which “[t]he humane values of equality,
freedom, and justice can exist and be affirmed without depending
on a transcendent deity or a spiritualized nation.”261 Indeed, a
variety of definitions and distinctions have been offered for civil
religion, not all of which emphasize the transcendent.262
To be sure, the presence of such definitions supports Smith’s
description of the revival of immanent or pagan understandings of
“the city” and its practices. Indeed, one critical discussion of
contemporary civil religion might be especially pleasing to Smith,
insofar as it is strikingly similar to much of his book’s broader
description of current trends in modern “paganism.” Walter
McDougall writes that such a
new civil religion will be spiritual inasmuch as it pays lip service
to a godhead with no qualities whatsoever except to be
ecumenical, androgynous, nurturing, and affirming. It will be
humanitarian to the point that it even suppresses freedoms of
speech, assembly, and religion in the name of therapeutic
equality.263

But the presence of competing visions of civil religion itself,
some more immanent and some more transcendent, also
complicates any clear story here. That complexity increases when
it becomes clear that they do not march in neat chronological order
from transcendent to immanent, but vary in prominence at
different times, sometimes coexisting and sometimes competing.264
The complexity increases still further when we consider that
both immanent and transcendent versions of civil religion can take
many forms265 and contain internal tensions, conflicts, and
contradictions. Barack Obama, whose political success and positions
on social issues are treated by Smith as “victories for the devotees of
immanence,”266 also “drench[ed] his presidency in civil religion,”267
260
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including transcendent religiosity. At least until it became
politically inconvenient, he worshipped under a pastor with a
distinctly prophetic conception of God’s interaction with the nation
and the world.268 Both transcendent and immanent civil religion
can end up compromised, neither offering a standard “by which to
judge [and justify] the nation” nor constituting us as a whole
“people.”269 McDougall argues that American civil religion,
whether immanent or transcendent, often ends up striking Devil’s
bargains, allowing Americans “to feel good about doing well.”270 It
is hard to see this longstanding version of civil religion as saying
much about a sacredness that lies “outside the world.”271 Finally,
it is hardly clear what direction American civil religion is taking.
Despite the seeming rise of paganism or immanent religiosity,
Donald Trump, a “secular, worldly” figure, offered “by far the most
spiritually drenched [inauguration] in the 228 years of the
presidency.”272 Given our unsettled culture and politics, it is
unclear which of the many past “dispensation[s]” of American civil
religion might re-emerge or what form a new one might take.273
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These complexities do not all contradict Smith’s arguments.
But they suggest that our messy reality cannot be captured by the
simple picture he paints of civil religion. We need not take Berger
as offering the authoritative definition of civil religion. Had Smith
chosen a different one, it would be harder to draw a stark
distinction between transcendent and immanent versions of civil
religion and to depict the latter as a new or revived competitor
with the former. Rather than attempt to arrive at a single
definition, one might instead emphasize the competing conceptions
of civil religion, their historical contingency, and the ways in which
different conceptions and definitions mix as well as compete. Or
one might conclude that civil religion defies definition. Under any
of these approaches, it is harder to speak about a neat Christianpagan or transcendent-immanent contest over civil religion.
What of the law with respect to public religious symbols?
Recall that Smith’s thesis is that “[i]n prohibiting endorsements
of ‘religion,’ the ‘no endorsement’ doctrine might mean that
government is forbidden to endorse traditional or transcendent
religion,” while “ ‘secular’ expressions of more immanent religiosity
might be permissible.”274 “[G]eneric [religious] expressions,”
sometimes including the invocation of God, that are “at least
susceptible . . . of an immanent interpretation” are more likely to
be upheld than expressions that are “more obviously sectarian” or
transcendent.275
It is true that the Court does not blink at public symbols, such
as the display of the flag, that “stir citizens’ feelings of reverence
and devotion.”276 It is equally true that courts are more likely to
frown on openly sectarian governmental religious statements. But
does the transcendent-immanent distinction really capture what
is going on in these cases?
One problem here concerns judicial rhetoric. How deeply should
we read the Supreme Court’s statements on these questions? Not
very, surely. The justices may write strategically, taking the sting
out of something like a ruling striking down a flag-burning statute
by offering a fulsome tribute to the flag. They may write honestly
but without much sincerity. Or they may be sincere but shallow,
throwing around evocative language without thinking much about
its deeper implications. A judicial robe is hardly proof against
274
275
276
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shallowness. And all this is true without even considering the role
of law clerks, with their youth and callowness, in the writing
process.
To be sure, the culture in which judges live leaves its traces
on the language they use, whether they mean it to or not.
Nonetheless, one should avoid reading more meaning into their
choice of words than really belongs there. The justices may use
terms like “sacred” or “consecrate” not falsely but casually, and
certainly without any considered conclusions about the immanent
or transcendent nature of sacredness. We should generally be
cautious about finding deeper social significance in what justices
write, just as we should hesitate before drawing conclusions about
musical genius and creative intention from the lowing of a
particularly euphonious cow.
Another problem lies between rhetoric and substance. It is true
that outright sectarianism in government speech or funding raises
Establishment Clause problems.277 But it is not clear how much
we can conclude about the cases that lie in the middle ground, the
ones Smith focuses on.278 The proposition that government
statements involving “more immanent religiosity might be
permissible” may have less to do with the kind of religiosity
involved than with the the bland, lowest-common-denominator
nature of these statements. Such statements can be consistent
with either an immanent or a transcendent reading.279 In any
case, they involve the kinds of symbols that, from the justices’
perspective, may seem both least objectionable and least worth
spending judicial capital on, in the event that citizens are angered
by a decision invalidating such a practice.
It is true that court decisions upholding such practices often
rely on rationales that minimize the religiosity of a statement or
symbol.280 And it is understandable that these rationales will be
277
Although that may have more to do with history, precedent, and political
equality than with transcendent religiosity. See David Cole, Faith and Funding:
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“unconvincing both to serious nonbelievers and to serious
believers.”281 But even those opinions in which justices offer secular
justifications for religious symbols or displays often also contain
statements that are more consistent with transcendent religiosity.
They uphold particular religious statements or symbols not
because they are secular or have been stripped of religious
significance, but because they have both secular and religious
significance.282 These opinions often focus on history. But that
does not necessarily mean they accept the public religious
statements under dispute only as a historical statement or
hallowed but secularized practice. They also employ history in
order to conclude—in a way that is consistent with transcendent
religiosity—that “official references to the value and invocation of
Divine guidance” are permissible whether the official was a longdead Framer or a “contemporary leader[ ].”283
Thus, a justice who insists that holidays like Christmas and
Chanukah must be celebrated as “secular holidays” for government
to be involved may also acknowledge that those holidays necessarily
have “both religious and secular dimensions.”284 Likewise, even
when insisting that a cross in a war memorial is “intended simply
to honor our Nation’s fallen soldiers,” the Court will acknowledge
forthrightly that the cross is “certainly a Christian symbol.”285
Although he rejected the proposition that the words “under God”
make the Pledge of Allegiance a “religious exercise,” Chief Justice
Rehnquist also emphasized that to some of “the millions of people

purpose as a “[c]elebration of public holidays, which have cultural significance even if
they also have religious aspects,” adding that Christmas “has very strong secular
components and traditions”); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35,
40 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (contending that government references to
religion are permissible where, although they “speak in the language of religious
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secular purposes”).
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who regularly recite the Pledge,” the phrase could mean “that God
has guided the destiny of the United States” or that “the United
States exists under God’s authority.”286
In sum, Smith is right that the Court has rejected outright
sectarianism in government religious symbols. He is right, too,
that when the Court upholds such symbols it generally emphasizes
the possibility of a “secular,” but still solemnizing or “sacred,”
understanding of the symbol. But, in keeping with the mixed
nature of most such symbols, the Court has not always done so in
ways that reject transcendent religiosity or require that a symbol
have solely immanent significance. I find it unlikely that the
Court has reflected deeply on these distinctions in its judgments.
But its language at least allows for transcendent understandings
of constitutionally permissible public religious symbols, even if it
requires that transcendent religiosity not be the sole or primary
purpose or effect of these expressions.
Finally, it is likely that the current Court will increasingly
and more openly acknowledge the transcendent meaning of
permitted government religious symbols. Consider Town of Greece
v. Galloway,287 in which the Court upheld a town board’s prayer
practice. As is typical of his jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy
combined the central holding—that we must look to “historical
practices and understandings” to determine the Establishment
Clause’s meaning—with various side-constraints, such as that
prayer policies should avoid a “course and practice” of
“denigrat[ing] nonbelievers or religious minorities.”288 And he
offered bland statements, consistent with immanent religiosity
although not necessarily in conflict with transcendent religiosity,
about the solemnizing and conciliatory function of legislative
prayer.289 Nevertheless, the Court permitted long-established
public religious symbols and practices on historical grounds alone,
even though a practice might have been rooted in transcendent
religiosity and many might still understand it that way; and it
affirmed that some of those practices could include openly
sectarian, transcendent statements.290
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The historical approach is likely to take on a greater role in
government religious display cases given recent personnel
changes on the Supreme Court.291 If it does, it will free up the
justices to acknowledge more frankly the transcendent religiosity
of the government religious symbols and statements they uphold.
They will be freer to reject Justice O’Connor’s arguments that
religious displays can be approved only if they have been leeched
of religious content and to insist instead that a religious statement
can indeed be strongly religious, even if it has other purposes.292 I
make no judgment here about whether this trend is good or bad.293
My point is simply that it complicates Smith’s conclusion that the
Court has “remove[d] the transcendent or Christian stratum of
American civil religion.”294 At a minimum, I suspect his conclusion
will have a short shelf life.
Thus, while much of Smith’s account is illuminating, I fear
that with respect to religious symbols, his “imposition” of order is
too “artificial” to help make sense of the “complex and messy
reality” we confront.295 It may be that the law in this area is messy
because of the contest between dispensations that frames Smith’s
project. His account may help us see aspects of that contest that
are hidden within the murk of the Court’s opinions. But I doubt it
can do more than that.
I close this section, and offer a segue to the next and final
part, with some observations on Smith’s provocative conclusion
to his discussion of debates over “[s]ymbols, [s]ex, and the
Constitution.”296 Smith argues that the symbols debate (and the
debate over sexuality, which I have omitted here) is connected to
a larger issue: “If the Constitution has been employed to make
public symbols and sexual norms less Christian and more pagan,
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the deployment of the Constitution for those ends has had the
effect of making the Constitution itself a more pagan
instrument.”297
The Constitution, on his view, is not itself “an overtly
Christian document.”298 Rather, it is agnostic, “deliberately
avoid[ing] any meaningful acknowledgment” of a transcendent
God—or a pagan immanent spirit, for that matter.299 Smith has
written that the agnostic structure of the Constitution
accomplished “what for centuries many had thought impossible—
namely, to take a mass of individuals and groups embracing a
multitude of different faiths and, without suppressing their
differences, to hold them together as a single community.”300 Now,
however, the “pagan” legal turn with respect to religious symbols,
along with changes in the legal status of “Christian norms of
sexual morality and marriage,” has rendered the Constitution
neither agnostic nor “Christian” but pagan.301 Smith paints the
result in technically neutral but distinctly dire terms:
In doing so, for better or worse, the Court has transformed the
nation’s most fundamental law—one that once stood majestically
above the fray of contesting religious and secular conceptions of
the community, and hence could serve as an anchor for the
allegiance even of citizens who found themselves in the situation
of being a political or cultural or religious minority—into a
partisan instrument in the struggle between transcendent and
immanent conceptions of the city.302

Notwithstanding the seeming neutrality of “for better or
worse,” it is hard to read this as anything other than a lament.
And it raises the obvious question: Was the Constitution ever, in
theory or in practice, “above the fray”? How could it possibly
regain a position above the fray today? And how does this thesis,
along with the lament for the lost agnosticism of the Constitution,
comport with Smith’s broader argument?
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Skepticism about laments like this usually focuses on the
present. No matter what golden age of consensus we once enjoyed,
the skeptic says, conditions of pluralism and polarization today
make real common ground impossible. But we might just as easily
ask whether the Constitution was ever in this happy position.
Even in his short account here, Smith notes that “a faction” during
the drafting and ratification period “wanted to acknowledge
Christianity in the nation’s fundamental law,” and that the postCivil War period saw competing constitutional amendments that
would have made the Constitution either explicitly secular or
explicitly Christian.303 And a longer account of American history
would record many “ugly, even violent” acts of religious repression,
contestation, combat, and bigotry.304 Both the proposed
constitutional amendments and the legal disputes that ensued
once the Religion Clauses became a matter for judicial review
suggest that the Constitution was always a part of this contest.
Can we then really say that it was ever “majestically above the
fray”?
Could we say it today? The value of the agnostic Constitution,
Smith argues, is that although “almost all Americans would in
different times and circumstances find themselves out of harmony
with positions taken by national, state, or local governments,” they
would at least have the comfort of an overarching agnostic
Constitution that refuses “to put its imprimatur on either
Christian or secular (or pagan) conceptions of the community.”305
But his reference to a “struggle between transcendent and
immanent conceptions of the city” reminds us that “the city” in any
given era is not a clearly demarked territory but a label for the
reigning authority and the scope of its power.306 Nationalizing
forces in culture, politics, and media, quite apart from any legal
developments, have pushed us toward a conception of our “city” as
the entire nation—as a singular The United States.307 Under those
conditions, it seems natural that the nation as a whole will be the
subject of partisan contestation between Christians and pagans,
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or between transcendent and immanent views in the American
“city.” As its governing law, the Constitution will inevitably be a
part of that contest.
This view seems more consistent with Smith’s general
narrative. Pagans and Christians in the City is the story of a
“recurring” and “centuries-long struggle” stemming from the fact
that each offered compromises the other side could not accept,
leading to “a struggle for ‘domination’—for control of the cultural
and political community and the self-conception by which the
community constitutes and governs itself.”308 If he is right about
that, it seems hard to believe that the Constitution ever was, or
could be today, above the fray. Surely it was always subject to
being a partisan instrument in the recurring battle. Even if one
accepts Smith’s historical description, the longue durée
perspective he offers in this book encourages us to view any
momentary harmony as a brief pause in a longer conflict. If his
book as a whole suggests anything, surely it is that if the
Constitution ever was above the fray, that was the exception. Its
current status as a field of combat is the norm we ought to expect.
CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL DYNAMIC OF THE
“CHRISTIAN-PAGAN STRUGGLE”
In this Essay, I have glossed Smith’s book mostly on its own
terms and argued that it offers insight into our ongoing and vexing
struggles over religious liberty, on and off the courts. If its use of
the “Christian” and “pagan” labels is deliberately provocative, it is
also instructive, at least if one keeps in mind Smith’s broad
definitions of those terms. Although I am less convinced by his
application of the Christian-pagan or transcendent-immanent
distinction to the debate over religious symbols and civil religion
than by his application of that distinction to the religious
accommodation debate, both are unquestionably useful. They
offer a new lens with which to view culture-war conflicts that are
real, but whose terms can become so tired and familiar as to arrest
one’s understanding rather than advance it.
If I have added anything new to Smith’s account from this
more or less internal perspective, it is to provide a more detailed
description of the dynamic of offer and refusal, counteroffer and
counter-refusal, and conflict that Smith identifies first in the
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ancient Christian-pagan battle and then again in our own times.309
It is worth quoting Smith again. In both eras, each side in the
culture wars takes its turn as the reigning dispensation. From
that position, it “[holds] out terms of mutual accommodation that
seem[ ] fair and reasonable to them, but that for discernible
reasons [are] not . . . accepted by the other side.”310 That each side
at some point is, or seeks to be, not just a side but a ruling
dispensation, and that the conflict has as much to do with the
compromises that are offered as with a more fundamental clash of
positions, are both neglected insights into the present culture
wars.
One value in drawing on the ancient Christian-pagan struggle
to understand this dynamic is that, for most of us, that past is
distant enough for one to feel little emotional identification with
either side.311 From a disinterested perspective, one can see that
each side thought of itself as offering a reasonable and acceptable
compromise. Each side, whether in or out of power, understood
itself to be seeking a “peaceful coexistence [that] should be possible
on fair and mutually acceptable terms.”312 It did so by offering
what it saw as a compromise that—from its perspective—asked
relatively little of the other side: just a few grains of incense. It
saw its own actions not as “gratuitously vindictive or malicious”
but as fair and reasonable.313 The very fact that the other side—
understandably and reasonably, from that perspective—saw the
offer as unacceptable fueled a sense that it was the other side that
was foolish, malicious, and potentially dangerous. Faced with
what looks from one’s own perspective like an “inflexible,
dogmatic” group, it is natural to conclude that the other side is
“undeserving of accommodation”: so unlikely to be satisfied with
any offer that there is little use in trying.314
It is natural that the logic of persecution should follow from
such premises. It is natural, too, that the result is “a struggle
for ‘domination’—for control of the cultural and political
309
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community.”315 Nor, given the importance of the perceived stakes
and the ways in which a dominant culture will permeate all
manner of public and private customs and institutions, is it
surprising that these battles should not only occur within
particular borders—such as the official apparatus of the “city”—
but also include battles over the borders themselves: over what is
public and what is private.
Two millennia is perhaps not enough time to get full
emotional distance from these disputes. But it is a start. That
distance may help us understand our own times and our own
conflicts better. That is so not just in the sense, ably pursued by
Smith in his book, that we are facing many of the same struggles
over the same issues: over “Christianity” and “transcendence,”
broadly conceived, and “paganism” and “immanence.” It is also
true in that the ancient contest between the pagans and the
Christians better helps us understand the dynamics of modernday struggles for cultural dominance.
Not least, it may help us to understand these dynamics more
sympathetically. Observing the ultimate failures of mutual
understanding in the ancient struggle, we may be slower to see our
side as reasonable and the other side as stubborn, calculating, and
undeserving of accommodation. We may accept the possibility
that our opponents are acting in good faith from their perspective.
We may see that despite good faith, each side fails “fully to grasp
and credit the other side’s commitments,” and thus offers
“reasonable” compromises—surrendering the ability to fully
honor one’s deep religious commitments, on the one hand, or
accepting less than the full measure of dignity and equality that is
every person’s right, on the other—that are understandably
unacceptable.316 We may thus better understand the dynamic of
conflict and power struggle that ensues.
None of this provides an answer. Maybe there is none to be
had. “[C]onflict is the name of our condition, and moreover,
naming it does nothing to ameliorate it or make it easier to
negotiate.”317 Even recognizing that the other side is reasonable
by its own lights and is offering a sincere compromise will not
make that compromise any more palatable if it fails to grasp our
315
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deep commitments and demands more than we can give. One may
conclude that the other side is reasonable and acting in good faith
and still believe just as strongly that the only answer is to win,
although Smith’s history suggests that it won’t be a final victory.
Winning is, after all, “like, better than losing.”318 For scholars and
noncombatants, however, there may be at least some value in
naming and understanding our condition. Even some of the
combatants may approach the field of battle differently if they
understand it better.
In that spirit, two aspects of the dynamic of the Christianpagan conflict that are not covered by Smith are worth exploring.
Both are descriptive. Neither is especially hopeful. Indeed, the
second point suggests that the field of conflict is even wider than
the one Smith depicts in his book. Still, both may help us
understand the current conflict better.
First, we might add further detail and nuance to the
dynamics, or political economy, of the conflict Smith describes.
The picture I draw is itself an effort to impose an interpretation on
a “complex and messy reality.”319 To the extent that it gets things
right, however, it adds detail to the general story Smith tells.320
Consider, then, the question whether and why any of the
compromises described in Smith’s book were ever acceptable to
both sides.321 At a minimum, it seems true that some periods of
318
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(2007) (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892)
(quotation and citation omitted)); see also Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The
Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 1020–22 (1991)
(discussing the consensus and “optimism” of this era, the presence of inter-faith
“alliance[s] which transcended denominational boundaries,” and “the taming effect
319
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church-state, or Christian-pagan, relations in American history
seem to have been calmer and less conflict-ridden than others.322
Sometimes, in other words, the compromises offered by the ruling
dispensation seem to have been accepted and to have worked
relatively well. At other times, that compromise is rejected, both
sides are at loggerheads, and the broader culture is characterized
more by conflict than by common ground. Why are some periods
relatively successful in keeping the peace while others—arguably
including our own—are not?
Despite considerable literature on law and social change, our
discussion of these issues often focuses “on the longer temporal
sweep of social and legal development” while giving us too little
information about the nature of those moments within “the life
cycle of social and legal change,” in which particular issues move
from being relatively uncontested to a state of “foregrounded
contestation.”323 It tells us too little about the moves, mechanisms,
institutions, and incentives of those moments of deep contestation:
in short, about the political economy of moments such as this one.
I would argue that periods of relatively successful compromise
are most likely under two conditions. The first is unsurprising.
Peace is more likely to prevail when one side has most of the power
and represents the shared views of both most of the people and
most of the elites who are in a position to offer and enforce
compromises. The need for consensus between the people and the
governing elites is an especially important factor that has
that America’s ‘toleration’ but ‘separation’ model of church/state relations [had] on
American religion,” while acknowledging criticisms of the era as one of “shallow
complacency” and “a religion that had become only bland Americanism,” and noting
the “complex inner dilemmas” that lay beneath the “public veneer” of the thenprevailing consensus).
322
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious
Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1047,
1070 (1996) (describing Herberg’s account of the Eisenhower era as one in which it
seemed that “the United States had solved the problem of religious conflict, and that
it had achieved substantial consensus on religious matters,” while noting the
existence of “another fault line, just below the surface and ready to erupt”). That fault
line, which is treated by Smith in his discussion of the “[s]truggle over [s]exuality,”
SMITH, supra note 1, at 282–94, was the imminent “dramatic reaction against some of
the traditional values of all three [major Judeo-Christian] faiths,” not least sexual
values, Laycock, supra; see also Laycock, supra note 8, at 839 (emphasis omitted)
(“Religious liberty has become much more controversial in recent years.”); Horwitz,
Hobby Lobby, supra note 116, at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“In the space
of a few short years, the basic terms of the American church-state settlement have
gone . . . from being taken for granted to being up for grabs.”).
323
Horwitz, Hobby Lobby, supra note 116, at 157, 185–86.
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garnered considerable attention of late.324 Where there is
widespread public consensus and that consensus is shared by
those who are in a position to justify (or rationalize), enforce, and
entrench it, the ruling dispensation is more likely to succeed. It
may offer a relatively thin compromise, and the compromise may
seem reasonable only to the party in power, but the history Smith
provides suggests that it will put something on the table.
The second condition under which compromise succeeds may
be more surprising. It is more possible at moments when neither
dispensation is securely in power and neither side is certain who
will win. When one side is certain that it is about to achieve a
strong political victory, taking a “hard line” may seem like a viable
and attractive approach.325 By contrast, when it is uncertain
which dispensation will prevail, compromise may be preferable to
uncertainty and there will be greater incentive to find a commonground solution.326 Although the point is rarely put directly, it
clearly has mattered in recent culture-war arguments. Many
recent discussions of free exercise law and the possibility of
legislative compromise between between religious liberty and
LGBTQ rights have focused on the question whether compromise
is still possible, or whether changes in the legal and cultural
consensus have rendered compromise less necessary and less
attractive.327 If the battle for power has much to do with the desire
324
For recent attempts to understand these issues, spurred by the rise of
populism and the election of Donald Trump, see generally, for example, ALAN I.
ABRAMOWITZ, THE GREAT ALIGNMENT: RACE, PARTY TRANSFORMATION, AND THE RISE
OF DONALD TRUMP (2018); JOHN SIDES ET AL., IDENTITY CRISIS: THE 2016
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE FOR THE MEANING OF AMERICA (2018). For
pre-Trump analyses of the divide between elites and the larger public, see, for
example, CHRISTOPHER HAYES, TWILIGHT OF THE ELITES: AMERICA AFTER
MERITOCRACY (2012); CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE
AMERICA, 1960–2010 (2013).
325
See, e.g., Horwitz, Positive Pluralism, supra note 116, at 1019–23 (discussing
Mark Tushnet’s argument, before Donald Trump’s election and in seeming confidence
that he would lose, that liberals should “tak[e] a hard line” rather than “trying to
accommodate the losers” (quoting Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch
Liberal Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.com/
2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouch-liberal.html [https://perma.cc/5NYG-P54P])).
326
Cf. Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 108
(1984) (“The uncertainty of prevailing in court provides an incentive for a risk-averse
party to compromise even though he sincerely believes that he is the aggrieved or
innocent party.”).
327
See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Accommodations and Third-Party
Harms: Constitutional Values and Limits, 106 KY. L.J. 717, 728–30 (2017–18) (noting
a brief window in which compromise over the contraceptive mandate “temporarily
brightened” because of a court-created greater equilibrium between the contending
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to be the side offering the compromise rather than the one faced
with the choice whether to accept it or not, then not knowing who
will be the offeror and who will be the offeree is a good moment for
some kind of negotiated settlement.
Each type of peace—the peace made possible by the certainty
that one holds power, and the peace made necessary because
neither side knows who will hold power—is different and will
result in different forms of compromise. But each provides the
possibility of some stability and calm, however momentary. When
the moment passes, we can expect the conflict to take on a fiercer
and more uncompromising cast.
The current moment looks unpromising, despite the relative
uncertainty presented by the division between elites and
populists, the sudden shift in power in 2016, and uncertainty
about whether and when it will suddenly shift again. The reason
has much to do with the political economy of our current debates.
We are arguably in a period of uncertainty about who will win.
This suggests that compromise ought to be possible and attractive.
But each side has strong incentives to argue that we are actually
in the first type of situation—the situation in which one side is
clearly dominant—and that it is the party in the driver’s seat.
Each side thus argues that the other side should accept whatever
compromise it may deign to offer.
For the “pagans,” that means “Christians” will have some
religious freedom, especially the freedom to believe and, within
“reason,” practice what they wish in the private and noncommercial
sphere but subject to the constraints of antidiscrimination law and
other legal regimes. Conversely, the “Christians” invite the
“pagans” to accept their victories on issues such as same-sex
marriage while accepting the right of business owners and others
sides, and arguing that with the election of Donald Trump and the decisive shift in
the balance of power, both sides lost any incentive to compromise); Mary Anne Case,
Why “Live-and-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious
Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 472 n.36
(2015) (arguing that the prospect of a definitive ruling favoring the constitutionality
of same-sex marriage meant that “the religious right has lost much of its chance to
propose compromise” on this issue); Horwitz, Positive Pluralism, supra note 116, at
1019 (arguing that “pluralist interventions in a culture-war cycle require a very
specific hospitable environment” in which “there is enough heated disagreement to
make an alternative to the shouting seem attractive” and in which “both sides agree
that there is a war, and think of either side as having a serious chance of winning it,
leaving them amenable to compromise and coexistence,” and adding that the window
for compromise on culture-war issues “may already have closed”).
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to refuse to provide service to some customers, to subsidize
contraceptive services, and so on. Whatever the actual balance of
power may be, each side has a strong incentive to describe itself as
holding the reins, and thus to insist that it need not accept the
compromise offered by the other side but in fact is in a position to
offer the compromise of its choice.
A variety of factors encourage this state of affairs. For one
thing, there is arguably not one “city” but two. Each side occupies
its own citadel. Because of physical sorting, online balkanization,
and radically different information sources,328 each side is
convinced that it occupies the “real” city, the “real America,” and
that the other side is in no position to bargain. This conviction is
reinforced by through both online and offline discussion. Each side
offers ever more strategic and rhetorically tilted narratives and
arguments, seeking to galvanize its own side rather than persuade
the other.329 It is enhanced by electoral politics. That includes the
work of interest groups, which naturally want to gain or retain
influence and raise money. Everyone today who receives mail
from candidates, parties, or interest groups is familiar with the
standard pitch, which argues simultaneously that they are on the
verge of a great victory and that this victory is in mortal peril (and
thus in desperate need of a donation).
In short, each side has every incentive to argue that it is
always almost winning and always gravely threatened. Each side
encourages its adherents to believe that they are the ones who
have won, or are about to win, the culture wars and that their
adversaries are unreasonable, unprincipled, and pose a clear
threat. Under these circumstances, it is unsurprising that the
struggle for “control of the cultural and political community” not

328
On these and other factors, see Horwitz, Positive Pluralism, supra note 116,
at 1005 nn.29–32 (collecting sources).
329
See, e.g., MATTHEW PRESSMAN, ON PRESS: THE LIBERAL VALUES THAT SHAPED
THE NEWS 249 (2018) (arguing that mainstream media in the mid-to-late twentieth
century were professional but generally drifted in a liberal direction and that
economic and other factors have encouraged a more adversarial form of liberal-leaning
journalism, even in mainstream newspapers, that represents a departure from the
professional norms that once prevailed, a strategy that “suggest[s] that major news
organizations are giving up on a large percentage of the population”). See generally
YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION,
AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2018) (arguing that conservative media
and online discussions form a feedback loop favoring conservative views and
encouraging confirmation bias and radicalization).

192

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 58:125

only persists but has grown more bitter.330 The political economy
of the modern culture war has made it a perpetual motion
machine. Things always change. But the current dynamics of our
institutions and debates offer little reason to hope they will change
any time soon.
The argument here is meant to add detail and nuance to
Smith’s broader narrative of the recurring conflict between
“Christians” and “pagans.” It uses a microscope to augment
Smith’s generally telescopic treatment. And I would add one
further detail to that picture. In focusing on the constitutive value
of symbols and their role in “battles over who we are,” Smith
focuses mostly on religious symbols.331 He argues that they are
especially important because “religious expressions may have a more
fundamental alienating effect than other sorts of controversial
public statements typically have.”332
If that was ever the case, it may no longer be. Increasingly,
at least in legal scholarship, the field of battle has expanded to
take in other statements and symbols. An argument gaining
steam among some writers on (and participants in) the broader
culture wars suggests that the Constitution “imposes a broad
principle of government nonendorsement,” under which
constitutional provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause,
taken in combination with the First Amendment, should be read
as “prohibit[ing] any [government] endorsement that abridges full
and equal citizenship in a free society.”333 At a minimum,334 this is
an argument for limitations on any government speech that
undermines the Constitution’s “[c]ommitments to full citizenship,
equal citizenship, and the maintenance of a free society.”335
Claims of this sort are quickly becoming more visible and popular
in American constitutional scholarship.336
330

SMITH, supra note 1, at 131, 265.
Id. at 272 (emphasis omitted).
332
Id. at 273.
333
Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 650 (2013)
(emphasis omitted).
334
See id. at 695–96 (noting the difficulty of determining the precise boundaries
of the government nonendorsement principle).
335
Id. at 702.
336
See, e.g., COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD
IT SAY?: HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 4
(2012); Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class-Citizenship, and Law’s
Social Meaning, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1283 (2011); Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, Chips off Our Block?: A Reply to Berg, Greenawalt, Lupu and
331
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This development is consistent with Marc DeGirolami’s recent
suggestion that given “the common theological, political, and
cultural assumptions prevalent in American society across time,”
and the relation of both freedom of speech and freedom of religion
to that larger “social superstructure,” it is natural that both
ultimately follow the same course of development—and that, in
our own time, “the rights of free speech and religious liberty are
likely to suffer similar fates.”337 The same disputes that have been
so salient in law and religion in recent years are likely to recur in
the area of free speech. Indeed, we have already seen a “migration
of the ‘weaponization’ accusation from religious freedom to free
speech over only a short span of years.”338 Likewise, as the
government nonendorsement scholarship suggests, we are
witnessing the application of the Establishment Clause–centered
idea that some religious expressions have a “fundamental
alienating effect” across a wider field of government speech.339
This should not be surprising, given the argument of Smith’s
book. If public symbols are understood to be “expressive and
constitutive not just of particular private speakers and groups, but
of the community,” and thus part of a broader “battle[ ] over who
we are,” then it makes sense that our disputes over symbols will
take in more ground than religion alone.340 If our debates over
religion have increasingly emphasized expressive and dignitary
harms,341 then it is unsurprising that people may come to believe
that other government statements and symbols are also
“fundamental[ly] alienating”342 and equally deserving of legal
redress. Moreover, if Smith is right in seeing a movement to
Tuttle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1281–83 (2007); Helen Norton, The Equal Protection
Implications of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159 (2012); Micah
Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Charlottesville’s Monuments Are Unconstitutional, SLATE
(Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/08/
charlottesville_s_monuments_are_unconstitutional.html [https://perma.cc/UB9J-WBR6].
For discussion, see Paul Horwitz, A Close Reading of Barnette, in Honor of Vincent
Blasi, 13 FIU L. Rev. 689, 713–15 (2019).
337
Marc O. DeGirolami, The Sickness Unto Death of the First Amendment, 42
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 751, 801, 804 (2019).
338
Id. at 804.
339
SMITH, supra note 1, at 273.
340
Id. at 271–72. As I noted earlier, debates over public statues and symbols in
the summer of 2020 support this argument and make clear that such debates are
hardly limited to the realm of legal scholarship.
341
See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Die and Let Live?: The Asymmetry of Accommodation,
88 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 708 (2015).
342
SMITH, supra note 1, at 273.
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expand the walls of the “city” so that things once thought of as
belonging to the “private sphere” are now part of the “public
domain,” then we can expect these battles over other symbols to
embrace not only government speech but also speech within the
marketplace.343 And so we have, as fights over statues on campus,
taking a knee at professional football games, and objectionable
speech by corporate executives and others all demonstrate.
The legal and cultural war over symbols is thus unlikely to
stop with religious symbols alone. Our civil religion and the fights
over it have always included a wider range of values, symbols,
rituals, and norms than just the narrowly religious. The struggle
for power, including the power to define ourselves as a community,
that Smith describes in the area of religion is ultimately part of a
broader battle for control over our symbolic and discursive space
in general. As large as it is, Smith’s canvas may not be large
enough. We should expect more of the same. We cannot know
whether the “city” will become “pagan” or “Christian” or for how
long. All we can expect is that it will continue to be hotly contested
ground.

343

Id. at 340 (emphasis omitted).

